Madras High Court
Sri Chandru vs K.Nagarajan on 12 March, 2012
DATED : 12.03.2012
CORAM :
THE HONOURABLE Mrs.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI
and
THE HONOURABLE Mrs.JUSTICE S.VIMALA
A.S.NO.277 OF 2008
1.Sri Chandru
2.S.Chitra ... Appellants
Vs.
1.K.Nagarajan
2.N.Logammal
3.Jaysatya
4.N.Prabhu
5.The General Manager,
Canara Bank Main Branch
Salem-1. .... Respondents
Prayer: Appeal Suit filed under Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and decree dated 30.10.2007 made in O.S.No.37 of 2006 on the file of Additional District Court cum Fast Track Court No.I, Erode.
For Appellants : Mr.R.Veeramani
For Respondents : Mr.S.Lakshminarayanan
for
RR.1 to 4
(Legal Aid)
Mr.S.Pandurangan
for
Respondent No.5
J U D G M E N T
R.BANUMATHI,J.
Being aggrieved by the dismissal of their suit for partition O.S.No.37 of 2006, unsuccessful plaintiffs have preferred this appeal. For convenience, the parties are referred as per their array in the Original Suit.
2. The plaintiffs and defendants 3 and 4 are the sons and daughters of defendants 1 and 2. Defendants 1 and 2 have been doing textile business in the name and style of M/s.Sri Ashtalakshmi Tex at Door No.59, Pulikuthi main road, Gugai, Salem. Each of defendants 1 and 2 are the sole proprietors of the said proprietary concerns. Both defendants 1 and 2 have availed financial assistance for their business concerns for which defendants 1 and 2 have mortgaged their properties viz., suit item Nos. 2 to 7 in favour of 5th defendant Bank by creating an equitable mortgage in respect of the said properties. By virtue of creation of equitable mortgage by defendants 1 and 2, 5th defendant Bank is having secured interest in suit Item Nos.2 to 7 properties. The loan accounts of defendants 1 and 2 were not regular as per their repayment schedule stipulated in the loan and security documents. Amount of Rs.10,62,402.31 and Rs.12,87,875.75ps were stated to be due from the defendants 1 and 2. Since the defendants 1 and 2 have failed and neglected to repay the loan amount, 5th defendant Bank had sent demand notice to defendants 1 and 2 under Section 13(2) of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (in short, "SARFAESI Act"). The 5th defendant had also taken possession of the properties by exercising its power conferred under Section 13(4) of the Act.
3. At that stage, plaintiffs, who are the son and daughter of defendants 1 and 2, have filed the suit for partition. Case of plaintiffs is that the 1st defendant continued family business of his ancestors. The 2nd defendant mother hailed from a poor family and she has no means or money to purchase the suit items 2 to 6 out of her own money. Suit Item Nos.2 to 6 were purchased from out of the income earned in the family business and purchased in the name of defendants 1 and 2. Though the property had been purchased in the name of 2nd defendant, it had been intended to be purchased for the family and treated as joint family properties and the same had been enjoyed in common. Further case of plaintiffs is that they demanded for partition and separate possession of the suit properties in the year 1995 and several times subsequently and Defendants 1 and 2 were evading. The properties are joint family properties and each of the plaintiffs and defendants 1, 3 and 4 are entitled to 1/5th share each. Stating that defendants 1 and 2 have no right to deal with the shares of the plaintiffs or other members of the joint family, plaintiffs have filed the suit for partition to divide the suit properties into five equal shares and allot one such share to each of the plaintiffs.
4. In the trial Court, defendants 1 to 4 remained exparte. The 5th defendant Bank filed the written statement contending as follows:-
As per Section 34 of SARFAESI Act, Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. If at all the plaintiffs are aggrieved by the action taken by the 5th defendant Bank under Section 13 of SARFAESI Act, the plaintiffs have to prefer an appeal before Debts Recovery Tribunal as contemplated under Section 17 of the Act, where the appeal shall be entertained only after payment of necessary court fees. Only in order to circumvent the statutory provisions, the defendants 1 and 2 have set up the plaintiffs to file the suit before the Civil Court, which is not having the jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The Bank further averred that the suit properties items 2 to 7 are self acquired properties of defendants 1 and 2 and that they are absolute owners of the properties and they are having all rights of alienation in respect of the properties. The plaintiffs have good locus standi to question the legality of the mortgage created by defendants 1 and 2 and the equitable mortgage is a valid one. The sole intention of the plaintiffs is to defeat the lawful claim of the 5th defendant.
5. On the above pleadings, in the trial Court, four issues were framed. On behalf of the plaintiffs, the 1st plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.A.1 to A.6 were were marked. Onbehalf of the Defendant Bank, the official of Bank was examined as D.W.1 and Exs.B.1 to B.4 were marked.
6. On the question of jurisdiction (Issue No.1), the trial Court held that the suit properties are situated in Attayampatti village; the plaintiffs have not challenged any of the measures taken under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act and that there is no bar for entertaining the suit. On other issues, the trial Court held that the plaintiffs have not produced any documents to prove their case that the suit properties are the ancestral properties. Referring to Exs.A.1 to A.6 sale deeds, trial Court further held that the suit properties are self acquired properties of defendants 1 and 2. Pointing out that the loan was borrowed by the defendants 1 and 2 for their textile business, the trial Court held that the mortgage is binding upon the plaintiffs and only to avoid paying mortgage debt, the plaintiffs have filed the suit for partition. On those findings, the trial Court dismissed the suit for partition.
7. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, plaintiffs have preferred this appeal. Learned counsel for appellants/plaintiffs contended that the appellants cannot be deprived of their legitimate share in item No.1 and other properties. It was further submitted that jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal is restricted only to any of the measures taken under Section 13 of SARFAESI Act and the Debt Recovery Tribunal cannot go into the question of Plaintiffs' shares. It was further submitted that the litigants/ plaintiffs are having genuine grievance of civil nature and have a right to institute the Civil Suit. In so far as the claim of share it was submitted that the 2nd defendant had no independent source of income and therefore all the items of suit properties are to be construed as the joint family properties and defendants 1 and 2 have no right to deal with the shares of the plaintiffs or other members of the family.
8. Defendants 1 to 4 have not entered appearance. On behalf of defendants 1 to 4, we have heard Mr.S.Lakshminarayanan, who was appointed as counsel through Legal Aid. We have heard Mr.S.Pandurangan, learned counsel appearing for the 5th defendant Bank.
9. The learned counsel for 5th defendant Bank has submitted that the suit is a collusive suit between the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 4. In view of the specific bar under Section 34 of SARFAESI Act and Section 18 of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (in short, RDDB Act ), Civil Suit is not maintainable. It was submitted that Section 13(2) notice was issued and possession was also taken and thereafter it was found that the secured property is an agricultural land and therefore the measures taken under Section 13 of SARFAESI Act was withdrawn and 5th defendant Bank had filed its claim before Debt Recovery Tribunal, Madurai in O.A.No.117 of 2008 for recovery of the amount.
10. We have carefully gone through the plaint pleadings, materials on record, impugned judgment and the rival contentions. The following points arise for determination in this appeal:
1. In view of bar under Section 34 of SARFAESI Act, whether the Civil Suit is barred?
2. Whether the suit property is proved to be joint family property and whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the decree for partition in respect of their shares?
3. To what relief, the parties are entitled to?
11. Point No.1:- Demand notices (dated 3.9.2004) Exs.B.3 and B.4 were sent by the 5th defendant Bank under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act to defendants 1 and 2. The 5th defendant had also taken possession of items 2 to 7 properties by virtue of power conferred under Section 13(4) of the Act. After the Bank had taken measures under Section 13 of SARFAESI Act, the plaintiffs filed the suit for partition. In the trial Court, the 5th defendant Bank raised objection that in view of the express bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, Civil Court has no jurisdiction. The trial Court did not elaborately go into the question regarding maintainability of the suit. In its cryptic findings, the trial Court held that the suit is maintainable on two grounds; (i) suit properties are situated in Erode; (ii) the 2nd plaintiff, defendants 1, 2 and 4 are residing in Erode; and (iii) the plaintiffs are not parties in the SARFAESI proceedings then pending before Debt Recovery Tribunal.
12. Placing reliance upon decisions in (i) INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT BANK OF INDIA LIMITED VS. MARSHAL'S POWER & TELECOM (I) LTD. AND ANOTHER ((2007) 1 SCC 106); (ii) V.THULASI VS. INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK (2011 (3) CTC 801), in which one of us (R.Banumathi,J.) was a member; and (iii) PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK VS,. J.SAMSATH BEEVI AND 3 OTHERS, (2010(3) CTC 310), learned counsel for 5th defendant Bank would submit that in view of the specific bar under Section 34 of SARFAESI Act and Section 18 of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (in short, RDDB Act ), Civil Suit is not maintainable.
13. In terms of Section 34 of SARFAESI Act, jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act reads as under:
34. Civil Court not to have jurisdiction - No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993).
14. As per Section 34, the bar of jurisdiction is two fold:
"(i) no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a DRT or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the Act; (ii) No injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any order conferred under the Act or under the RDDB Act."
15. Under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, right of appeal is provided to any person including a borrower. Under the SARFAESI Act, only one appeal has been provided i.e., against measures taken under Section 13(4). A careful reading of Section 13(4) shows that Section 13(4) embodies various modes of recovery of the secured debts of the secured creditor. If any one including the borrower feels aggrieved by the mode of recovery, which a secured creditor may adopt, he has a right to prefer an appeal in terms of Section 13.
16. Placing reliance upon a judgment of single judge of this Court in the case of ARASA KUMAR AND ANOTHER VS. NALLAMMAL AND OTHERS, (2004(4) CTC 261), learned counsel for appellants/plaintiffs contended that bar created under Section 34 is not absolute and is subject to restrictions. It was submitted that parties, who claim the property, which is subject matter of mortgage in favour of Bank, can approach the Civil Court, if their grievance claiming share cannot be redressed by the Tribunal. The learned counsel would further submit that the plaintiffs' claim for partition of joint family property would not fall within the meaning of any of the measures taken under Section 13(4) and therefore the suit is well maintainable.
17. In NAHAR INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES LTD. VS. HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, 2009 (4) CTC 74 = (2009) 8 SCC 646, the Honourable Supreme Court considered the question of exclusion of jurisdiction and matters pertaining to DRT and the scope of Sections 17 and 18 of RDDB Act. Referring to DHULABHAI VS. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH, (AIR 1969 SC 78), and other cases, the Supreme Court in the above said judgment held as under: "105. The Civil Court indisputably has the jurisdiction to try a suit. If the suit is vexatious or otherwise not maintainable action can be taken in respect thereof in terms of the Code. But if all suits filed in the Civil Courts, whether inextricably connected with the application filed before the DRT by the banks and financial institutions are transferred, the same would amount to ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts indirectly. Suits filed by the debtor may or may not be counter claims to the claims filed by banks or financial institutions but for that purpose consent of the Plaintiff is necessary.
106. It is furthermore difficult to accept the contentions of the Respondents that the statutory provisions contained in Section 17 and 18 of the DRT Act have ousted the jurisdiction of the civil court as the said provisions clearly state that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in relation only to applications from banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions. ....
108. Although some arguments have been advanced before us whether having regard to the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 of the Act the civil court jurisdiction is completely ousted, we are of the view that the jurisdiction of the civil court would be ousted only in respect of the matters contained in Section 18 which has a direct co-relation with Section 17 thereof, that is to say that the matter must relate to a debt payable to a bank or a financial institution. The application before the Tribunal would lie only at the instance of the bank or the financial institution for the recovery of its debt. It must further be noted in this respect that had the jurisdiction of the civil courts been barred in respect of counterclaim also, the statute would have said so and Sections 17 and 18 would have been amended to introduce the provision of counterclaim. ....
117. The Act, although, was enacted for a specific purpose but having regard to the exclusion of jurisdiction expressly provided for in Sections 17 and 18 of the Act, it is difficult to hold that a civil court's jurisdiction is completely ousted....
118. The liabilities and rights of the parties have not been created under the Act. Only a new forum has been created. The banks and the financial institutions cannot approach the Tribunal unless the debt has become due. In such a contingency, indisputably a civil suit would lie. There is a possibility that the debtor may file preemptive suits and obtain orders of injunction, but the same alone, in our opinion, by itself cannot be held to be a ground to completely oust the jurisdiction of the civil court in the teeth of Section 9 of the Code. Recourse to the other provisions of the Code will have to be resorted to for redressal of his individual grievances.
18. The question of maintainability of civil suit for partition is to be considered in the light of the above decision of the Supreme Court. The suit properties were mortgaged in favour of the Bank. On 3.9.2004, Exs.B.3 and B.4 - Section 13 (2) notices were issued to defendants 1 and 2. The 5th defendant Bank had taken possession of item Nos.2 to 7 exercising its power under Section 13(4) of the Act.
19. As per Section 31, the provisions of SARFAESI Act are not to apply in certain cases. As per Section 31(i), provisions of the Act shall not apply to security interest created in agricultural land. On coming to know that the security interest has been created in agricultural land, the 5th defendant Bank had withdrawn the measures taken under Section 13 of the Act and proceeded to file its claim in O.A.No.117 of 2008 before Debt Recovery Tribunal, Madurai. Section 18 of RDDB Act also contains express bar of ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It is for enforcement of its secured interest the Bank had taken steps and that right remains in tact even in a suit for partition.
20. Power under Section 34 of SARFAESI Act is not absolute and is subject to restrictions. They are:- (1) that parties who filed suit must be party to liabilities created in favour of secured creditors, (2) disputes between parties could be resolved under provisions of Act itself; (3) if claim made by parties is outside jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal or Appellate tribunal thereto or any action taken or to be taken under the Act and also under Recovery of Debt due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and disputes raised by parties cannot be adjudicated by Tribunal or Authority created under Act.
21. As per the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in NAHAR INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES LTD. VS. HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, 2009 (4) CTC 74 = (2009) 8 SCC 646, recourse to other provisions of the Code will have to be made for redressal of individual grievance. For redressal of individual grievances, they have to approach only Civil Courts. When such Civil suits are filed, Courts are to be cautious about astute drafting of plaint. Courts have a duty to see that whether the plaint allegations are made by trying to bring Civil Suit within the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. vs. Union of India, case (2004(2) CTC 759 (SC) and under the pretext of seeking redressal of individual grievance.
22. Observing that Courts have a greater duty to see that the allegations of fraud are made just for the purpose of maintaining a Civil Suit and categorising such civil suits filed challenging SARFAESI Act in 3 or 4 categories, in Punjab National Bank vs. J.Samsath Beevi, (2010(3) CTC 310)), V.Ramasubramanian,J., held as under:
8. But at the same time, the Court has a duty to see, if such allegations of fraud are thrown, just for the purpose of maintaining a suit and ousting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and to keep the Banks and Financial Institutions at bay. If by clever drafting, the plaintiff creates an illusion of a cause of action, the Court is duty bound to nip it in the bud. To find out if it is just a case of clever drafting, the Court has to read the plaint, not formally, but in a meaningful manner. So is the dictum of the Apex Court in T.Arivandandam vs. T.V.Satyapal {1977 (4) SCC 467}. It was again reiterated by the Court in I.T.C. Ltd vs. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal {1998 (2) SCC 70}, by holding that clever drafting, creating illusions of cause of action are not permitted in law. The ritual of repeating a word or creation of an illusion in the plaint can certainly be unravelled and exposed by the Court while dealing with an application under Order VII, Rule 11(a).
9. A Court is obliged to see if the allegations of fraud and collusion made in the plaint, are themselves a product of "fraud and collusion" between the family members of the borrowers, so as to escape liability and save the secured assets, somehow or the other. In the recent past, there is a sudden spurt in the number of civil cases filed against the actions initiated by Banks and Financial Institutions, either under the 1993 Act or under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. All these cases fall under 3 or 4 categories viz., (i) cases filed by strangers claiming that their properties are brought to sale on the basis of forged documents or certified copies of documents submitted by borrowers to banks (ii) cases filed by guarantors claiming that they never signed letters of guarantee or offered their properties as securities
(iii) cases filed by close relatives of borrowers such as spouses, children, brothers and sisters, claiming that they have a share in the properties mortgaged by the borrowers and that they were never aware of and they never gave consent to the properties being offered as securities and (iv) cases filed by third parties claiming that the properties were sold to them by the borrowers or guarantors by suppressing the creation of the mortgage and that they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the encumbrances.
10. It is not very difficult for a seasoned litigant or an intelligent lawyer to draft the plaint in such a manner as to make a secured asset, come within anyone of the above 4 categories, by a clever drafting of the plaint, thereby creating an illusion of fraud, collusion, misrepresentation and the like. Today, with the advancement of technology, the creation of an illusion and the creation of a virtual world are both possible. The moment the civil suit is taken on file, the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal or under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, gets slowed down. This results in two consequences viz., (i) out of frustration, the banks agree for one time settlements or (ii) third party rights get created by taking advantage of the situation. Therefore, the Courts have a greater responsibility to scan the pleadings and see if the allegations of fraud and collusion made in the plaint are actually a product of fraud and collusion between the borrowers and those making such claims.
23. Courts have a duty to see whether genuine grounds have been made out to attract the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. No generalisation could be made as to when a Civil Suit is maintainable or when the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted. In the facts and circumstances of each case, it is to be examined whether there is genuine grievance to be redressed in the Civil Court. In V.THULASI VS. INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK, (2011(3) CTC 801), this Court held that the suit is specifically barred under Section 34 of the Act and the plaint is liable to be rejected.
24. In the case on hand, the plaintiffs are son and daughter of the borrowers. Case of plaintiffs is that without their knowledge, the properties were mortgaged. Admittedly, defendants 1 and 2 are carrying on textile business and they have availed financial assistance from the bank only for their textile business. The properties, being the self-acquired properties of the 2nd defendant, were offered as security for availing financial assistance. At the time of taking loan, the plaintiffs, being young age, there would have been no occasion to take their consent for offering the property as securities. It is in this context the Court has to analyse the plaint averments.
25. As pointed out earlier, in the present case, the trial Court did not elaborately go into the question of jurisdiction, but proceeded with the matter on the footing held that the suit is maintainable. Therefore, without elaborating any further, we need to consider the appeal on the footing that the Civil Suit is maintainable.
26. Point No.2:- As pointed out earlier, in 1998, the parents of the plaintiff borrowed the amount from 5th defendant Bank for their textile business and with an intention to create security by way of equitable mortgage,they have deposited the title deeds of the suit properties 2 to 7. Case of plaintiffs is that the suit properties are joint family properties and that their mother - 2nd defendant did not have any independent source of income and that the suit properties Items 2 to 7 were purchased only from out of the income of the joint family.
27. The plaintiffs have not produced any documents to show that the suit properties are their joint family properties. By perusal of the evidence and materials on record, the details of the properties purchased are as under:- Sale Deed/ Settlement deed
Extent and S.No.
Suit Property Item Number
Ex.A.1 dated 28.4.1986 in favour of 2nd Defendant
1400 Sq.ft. (plot No.17) in S.No.22/8
3
Ex.A.2 dated 9.12.1991 in favour of Nityanandam
1400 Sq.ft. in
S.No.39/2C4
5
Ex.A.3 dated 14.9.1992 in favour of 2nd Defendant
1890 Sq.ft in S.No.39/2C4
4
Ex.A.4 dated 12.3.1993 in favour of 2nd defendant
747 = sq.ft. in S.No.25/4
2
Ex.A.5 dated 17.11.1995 in favour of 2nd defendant
2100 Sq.ft. in
S.No.39/2C4
6
Ex.A.6 settlement deed in favour of 1st defendant
4235 sq.ft. in S.Nos.22/2, 22/4 and 22/5 (Plot Nos.10, 11and 12)
7
Exs.A.1 and A.3 to A.5 would clearly show that the properties were purchased by the 2nd defendant. Under Ex.A.6- settlement deed, dated 2.6.1998, the 2nd defendant had settled the property of 4235 sq.ft. in Survey Nos.22/2, 22/4 and 22/5 (Plot Nos.10,11 and 12), which is item No.7 in suit property, in favour of her husband by settlement deed.
28. Case of plaintiffs is that the acquisitions were made from out of the income from ancestral property/joint family property. To prove that the suit properties are joint family properties, the plaintiffs are to adduce evidence as to existence of nucleus. The mere existence of nucleus alone is not enough to hold that the acquisitions were made utilising the income from nucleus. Absolutely, there is no evidence as to the existence of nucleus and what was the income derived from such nucleus. Onbehalf of the plaintiffs, it was submitted that the plaintiffs cannot be deprived of their share in item No.1. By perusal of the description of the suit properties, it is seen that item No.1 is only the house site and house thereon. In the absence of any proof regarding nucleus or the income of the joint family and in the absence of any evidence, the contention of the plaintiffs that the suit properties are the joint acquisitions does not merit acceptance.
29. As discussed earlier, suit properties Item Nos. 2 to 6 are purchased in the name of family member - 2nd defendant. When the properties are purchased in the name of family member of a Hindu family, there is no presumption that those properties are purchased from out of the joint family income. This is all the more so, when no evidence was adduced as to the existence of joint family property and the income derived therefrom. When the properties acquired by the 2nd defendant are the self acquisitions of defendants 1 and 2, the 2nd defendant has also independent power of mortgage, sale or other alienations.
30. Case of plaintiffs is that they demanded partition and separate possession from the year 1995. At the time of filing suit in 2008, the plaintiffs are aged 27 and 32 years respectively i.e., the plaintiffs were born in 1981 and 1975 respectively. While so, it is quite unbelievable that the 1st plaintiff even at the age of 14 and second plaintiff - daughter at the age of 20 would have demanded partition from their parents. There is also no evidence to show under what circumstances the plaintiffs were so compelled to demand for partition at such an young age.
31. Let us assume that the suit properties are the joint family properties. The loan was borrowed by defendants 1 and 2 for their textile business. The 1st defendant, being the father, has power to deal with the properties by creating security by way of equitable mortgage for business/family necessity. The 1st defendant, being the Manager/kartha of the family, represents all the family members in all transactions. When the Bank loan was obtained for the benefit of the family/business purposes, the security created is binding on the plaintiffs and defendants 3 and 4.
32. As held by the trial Court, the suit appears to have been filed only to delay/evade the repayment of the loan amount to the 5th defendant Bank. Upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence,the trial Court rightly held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief of partition. We do not find any reason warranting interference with the findings of the trial Court.
33. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs.
(R.B.I., J.) (S.V., J.)
Index: Yes 12.03.2012
Internet: Yes
usk
To
The Addl. District and Sessions Judge,
-cum- Fast Track Court No.I, Erode.
R.BANUMATHI, J.
and
S.VIMALA,J.
usk
Pre-Delivery
Judgment in
A.S.No.277 of 2008
12.03.2012
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