Specific Performance sec.16 (c) – failure to discharge Bank Loan as per the agreement of sale

Specific Performance sec.16 (c) – failure to discharge Bank Loan as per the agreement of sale – filing suit after 7 years for specific performance after filing a suit for recovery of possession by owner –

 Both lower courts found that the appellant is at fault – Apex court held that there is concurrent finding of fact and the same is evident from the record that the plaintiff (present appellant) has failed to perform his part of contract, as such, in our opinion, above case law is of little help to the plaintiff/appellant, and the courts below have not erred in law in not granting the relief of specific performance of contract to the plaintiff in OS.No.37 of 1985.

 For the reasons as discussed above, we find no illegality in the judgment and orders challenged before us. 

Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed with costs.= CIVIL APPEAL NOs.6071-6072 OF 2007 TELIKICHERLA SESIBHUSHAN (DEAD) BY LRS ……………APPELLANTS VERSUS KALLI RAJA RAO (DEAD) BY LRS & ORS. ……………RESPONDENTS =2014 – Sept. Month – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41892

 ADVMOHAN ⋅ SEPTEMBER 21, 2014 ⋅ 

Specific Performance sec.16 (c) – failure to discharge Bank Loan as per the agreement of sale – filing suit after 7 years for specific performance after filing a suit for recovery of possession by owner – Both lower courts found that the appellant is at fault – Apex court held that there is concurrent finding  of  fact  and the same is evident from the record that the plaintiff  (present  appellant) has failed to perform his part of contract, as such, in our  opinion,  above

case law is of little help  to  the  plaintiff/appellant,  and   the  courts below have not erred  in  law  in  not  granting   the  relief  of  specific performance of contract to the plaintiff in OS.No.37 of 1985. For the reasons as discussed above,  we  find  no  illegality  in  the judgment and orders challenged before us. Accordingly, both the appeals  are dismissed with costs.=

respondent-  Kalli  Raja  Rao

(since dead) agreed to sell the  property  measuring  an  area  of  Ac.19.96

cents situated at Pulla village of Eluru Taluk  for an amount of Rs.80,000/-

(Rupees eighty thousand only) under the agreement of sale (  Ex.A/1)  dated

10th May, 1980.

The said agreement discloses  that  respondent-  Kalli  Raja

Rao had taken a loan of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only)  from  the

State Bank of India, Eluru Branch, in the year 1969 and he could  not  repay

the loan, as such,  he intended to sell his land, and the present appellant-

Telikicherla Sesibhushan  agreed to repay the  loan  amount  with  interest

due from Kalli Raja Rao, to the Bank.

It appears that the appellant  though

made certain payments but failed  to  repay  the  entire  loan  amount  with

interest.

Consequently, the Bank instituted a suit being O.S.No.208 of  1981

against the debtor for recovery of the amount before the Subordinate  Judge,

Eluru.

Later, in the said suit the present appellant got  himself  impleaded

as a party. The suit filed by the Bank  for  recovery  of  Rs.46,408.85  was

decreed  with  interest  on  31st  December,  1986  and  the  same  attained

finality.

Since the commitment made by the appellant was  not  fulfilled  by

him regarding the repayment of the loan amount,  as  such,  Kalli  Raja  Rao

filed  suit being O.S. No.28 of 1985 before  the  Subordinate  Judge,  Eluru

against the appellant for recovery  of  possession  of  land  which  he  had

delivered to him at the time of aforesaid agreement of sale.

On  this,  the

appellant appears to have filed O.S.No.37 of 1985 after a  period  of  seven

years of agreement against  Kalli  Raja  Rao  for  specific  performance  of

contract,  before  the  Subordinate  Judge,  Eluru.  

Both  the  suits   i.e.

O.S.No.28 of 1985 and  O.S.No.37  of  1985  were  disposed  of  vide  common

judgment and order dated 12th June, 1996. 

The concluding part  of  the  said

judgment and order of the trial court reads as under:

“ 26.  In the result, O.S.No.28/85 is dismissed. The court  fee  payable  on

the plaint in O.S.No.28/85 shall be collected from  out  of  the  estate  of

late Rajarao which will come into the hands of his legal  heirs,  Plaintiffs

2 to 10 . O.S.No.37/85 is partly allowed with the following conditions:-

The Defendants 2 to 10 shall deposit an amount of Rs.71,552-45 paise in  the

court within three months from today,  and  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to

withdraw the above amount to be deposited in the court.

The  plaintiff  shall  surrender  the  possession  of  the  plaint  schedule

properties of the Defendants 2 to 10 within  one  month  from  the  date  of

deposit of Rs.71,552-45 paise to be made by the Defendants 2 to  10  in  the

Court.

In view of the relationship between the parties and in view of  the  present

facts of the case, I am not inclined to make any order as to costs  in  both

the suits.”

From the above quoted para it is clear that the suit filed by Kali Raja  Rao

was dismissed, and the suit filed by the appellant for specific  performance

of contract was not decreed but the amount paid by him towards repayment  of

loan was directed to be paid back to him.=

High court

 51.   In the result, A.S. 2052 of 1996 is dismissed confirming the  decree

and judgment in O.S. 37 of 1985 of the trial  Court.  A.S.2652  of  1996  is

allowed, and consequently O.S.28 of 1985 is decreed  subject  to  fulfilling

of conditions  imposed in the decree in  O.S.37  of  1985  the  vendors  are

entitled to possession on deposit of amount as directed by the trial  Court

=

It is clear from the record  that  there is  concurrent  finding  of

fact  against the present  appellant  by both the  courts  below  that   the

appellant failed to prove that he had been ready and willing to perform  his

part  of  the contract. 

Having gone through the papers on record,  we   find

that since the present appellant failed to repay the entire loan  amount  in

terms of the agreement, and the  suit   filed   by   the  Bank  against  the

debtor    for    recovery    of    remaining    amount    of    loan     was

decreed, as such, there was ample  evidence  on  record  to  hold  that  the

appellant failed to perform his part of contract,  as  such,  it  cannot  be

said that he is entitled to the relief of specific performance of  contract.

It is pertinent to mention here that the suit for  specific  performance  of

contract was filed by  the  plaintiff/appellant  after  a  period  of  seven

years, and it is not proved on  the  record  that  the  plaintiff  had  been

always ready and willing to perform his part of contract.=

In the case of Aniglase Yohannan vs. Ramlatha & Ors. (2005) 7 SCC  534

in which reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant,  it  has  been

held that where from the pleadings   and  evidence  of  the  parties  it  is

manifest that the plaintiff was ready and willing to  perform  his  part  of

the contract, the relief of specific performance may not be denied  to  him.

Relevant parts of paragraph 9 and 12 of the said judgment read as under:

“9.    The requirements to be fulfilled  for  bringing  in  compliance  with

Section 16(c) of the Act have been  delineated  by  this  Court  in  several

judgments. Before dealing with the various judgments it is necessary to  set

out the factual position. The agreement for sale was executed  on  15-2-1978

and the period during which the sale was to be completed  was  indicated  to

be [pic]six months. Undisputedly, immediately after the expiry of  the  six-

months’  period,  lawyer’s  notice  was  given  calling  upon  the   present

appellant to execute the sale deed. It is also averred in  the  plaint  that

the plaintiff met the defendant several times and requested him  to  execute

the sale deed. On finding inaction on  his  part,  the  suit  was  filed  in

September 1978. This factual position has been  highlighted  in  the  plaint

itself. The learned Single Judge after  noticing  the  factual  position  as

reflected in the averments in the  plaint  came  to  hold  that  the  plaint

contains  essential  facts  which  lead  to  inference  to  the  plaintiff’s

readiness  and  willingness.  Para  3  of  the  plaint  indicates  that  the

plaintiff was always ready to  get  the  sale  deed  prepared  after  paying

necessary consideration. In para 4 of the plaint, reference  has  been  made

to the lawyer’s notice calling upon the defendant to execute the sale  deed.

In the said paragraph it has  also  been  described  as  to  how  after  the

lawyer’s notice was issued the plaintiff met the defendant. In para 5 it  is

averred that the defendant is bound to execute the sale  deed  on  receiving

the balance amount and the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  get  the  document

executed by the defendant. It is  also  not  in  dispute  that  the  balance

amount of the agreed consideration was deposited in court simultaneously  to

the filing of the suit.

Xx         xx          xx

12. The basic principle behind Section 16(c) read with Explanation  (ii)  is

that any person seeking benefit of  the  specific  performance  of  contract

must manifest that his conduct has  been  blemishless  throughout  entitling

him to the specific relief. The provision imposes a personal bar. The  Court

is to grant relief on the  basis  of  the  conduct  of  the  person  seeking

relief. If  the  pleadings  manifest  that  the  conduct  of  the  plaintiff

entitles him to get the relief on perusal of the plaint  he  should  not  be

denied the relief.”

7.       But in the present case, there is concurrent finding  of  fact  and

the same is evident from the record that the plaintiff  (present  appellant)

has failed to perform his part of contract, as such, in our  opinion,  above

case law is of little help  to  the  plaintiff/appellant,  and   the  courts

below have not erred  in  law  in  not  granting   the  relief  of  specific

performance of contract to the plaintiff in OS.No.37 of 1985.

8.    For the reasons as discussed above,  we  find  no  illegality  in  the

judgment and orders challenged before us. Accordingly, both the appeals  are

dismissed with costs.

2014 – Sept. Month –http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41892

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.6071-6072 OF 2007

TELIKICHERLA SESIBHUSHAN
(DEAD) BY LRS ……………APPELLANTS

VERSUS

KALLI RAJA RAO
(DEAD) BY LRS & ORS. ……………RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T

PRAFULLA C.PANT,J.

1. These two appeals are directed against the common judgment and order
dated 15th June, 2007 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Appeal
Suit Nos.2652 and 2052 of 1996.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the papers
on record.
3. The factual matrix of the case is that respondent- Kalli Raja Rao
(since dead) agreed to sell the property measuring an area of Ac.19.96
cents situated at Pulla village of Eluru Taluk for an amount of Rs.80,000/-
(Rupees eighty thousand only) under the agreement of sale ( Ex.A/1) dated
10th May, 1980. The said agreement discloses that respondent- Kalli Raja
Rao had taken a loan of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) from the
State Bank of India, Eluru Branch, in the year 1969 and he could not repay
the loan, as such, he intended to sell his land, and the present appellant-
Telikicherla Sesibhushan agreed to repay the loan amount with interest
due from Kalli Raja Rao, to the Bank. It appears that the appellant though
made certain payments but failed to repay the entire loan amount with
interest. Consequently, the Bank instituted a suit being O.S.No.208 of 1981
against the debtor for recovery of the amount before the Subordinate Judge,
Eluru. Later, in the said suit the present appellant got himself impleaded
as a party. The suit filed by the Bank for recovery of Rs.46,408.85 was
decreed with interest on 31st December, 1986 and the same attained
finality. Since the commitment made by the appellant was not fulfilled by
him regarding the repayment of the loan amount, as such, Kalli Raja Rao
filed suit being O.S. No.28 of 1985 before the Subordinate Judge, Eluru
against the appellant for recovery of possession of land which he had
delivered to him at the time of aforesaid agreement of sale. On this, the
appellant appears to have filed O.S.No.37 of 1985 after a period of seven
years of agreement against Kalli Raja Rao for specific performance of
contract, before the Subordinate Judge, Eluru. Both the suits i.e.
O.S.No.28 of 1985 and O.S.No.37 of 1985 were disposed of vide common
judgment and order dated 12th June, 1996. The concluding part of the said
judgment and order of the trial court reads as under:

“ 26. In the result, O.S.No.28/85 is dismissed. The court fee payable on
the plaint in O.S.No.28/85 shall be collected from out of the estate of
late Rajarao which will come into the hands of his legal heirs, Plaintiffs
2 to 10 . O.S.No.37/85 is partly allowed with the following conditions:-

The Defendants 2 to 10 shall deposit an amount of Rs.71,552-45 paise in the
court within three months from today, and the plaintiff is entitled to
withdraw the above amount to be deposited in the court.

The plaintiff shall surrender the possession of the plaint schedule
properties of the Defendants 2 to 10 within one month from the date of
deposit of Rs.71,552-45 paise to be made by the Defendants 2 to 10 in the
Court.

In view of the relationship between the parties and in view of the present
facts of the case, I am not inclined to make any order as to costs in both
the suits.”
From the above quoted para it is clear that the suit filed by Kali Raja Rao
was dismissed, and the suit filed by the appellant for specific performance
of contract was not decreed but the amount paid by him towards repayment of
loan was directed to be paid back to him. It appears that both the parties
preferred appeals against the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the
trial court, and the same were disposed of together by the High Court with
the following concluding paragraph:
“ 51. In the result, A.S. 2052 of 1996 is dismissed confirming the decree
and judgment in O.S. 37 of 1985 of the trial Court. A.S.2652 of 1996 is
allowed, and consequently O.S.28 of 1985 is decreed subject to fulfilling
of conditions imposed in the decree in O.S.37 of 1985 the vendors are
entitled to possession on deposit of amount as directed by the trial Court.
The vendors are entitled to mesne profits to be determined on a separate
application to be filed before the trial Court. The vendors are entitled
to mesne profits to be determined on a separate application to be filed
before the trial Court from the date of suit O.S.28 of 1985 till the date
of possession. However, while evaluating mesne profits the amounts
deposited by virtue of this Court’s order namely Rs.50,000/- per year
should be given effect to. The vendors are entitled to withdraw the amounts
deposited by the vendee pursuant to the orders of this Court.”
4. It is clear from the record that there is concurrent finding of
fact against the present appellant by both the courts below that the
appellant failed to prove that he had been ready and willing to perform his
part of the contract. Having gone through the papers on record, we find
that since the present appellant failed to repay the entire loan amount in
terms of the agreement, and the suit filed by the Bank against the
debtor for recovery of remaining amount of loan was
decreed, as such, there was ample evidence on record to hold that the
appellant failed to perform his part of contract, as such, it cannot be
said that he is entitled to the relief of specific performance of contract.
It is pertinent to mention here that the suit for specific performance of
contract was filed by the plaintiff/appellant after a period of seven
years, and it is not proved on the record that the plaintiff had been
always ready and willing to perform his part of contract.
5. Clause (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that specific
performance of contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails
to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and
willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be
performed by him, other than terms the performance of which he has been
prevented or waived by the defendant. In the present case, as discussed
above, due to the failure on the part of the appellant to repay the loan in
terms of the agreement dated 10th May, 1980 (Ex.A.1) and further
considering the fact that not only the suit being O.S.No.208 of 1981 filed
by the creditor Bank was decreed against the debtor but it attained
finality, the Courts below have committed no error of law in refusing to
decree the suit of the appellant for specific performance of contract.
6. In the case of Aniglase Yohannan vs. Ramlatha & Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 534
in which reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant, it has been
held that where from the pleadings and evidence of the parties it is
manifest that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of
the contract, the relief of specific performance may not be denied to him.
Relevant parts of paragraph 9 and 12 of the said judgment read as under:

“9. The requirements to be fulfilled for bringing in compliance with
Section 16(c) of the Act have been delineated by this Court in several
judgments. Before dealing with the various judgments it is necessary to set
out the factual position. The agreement for sale was executed on 15-2-1978
and the period during which the sale was to be completed was indicated to
be [pic]six months. Undisputedly, immediately after the expiry of the six-
months’ period, lawyer’s notice was given calling upon the present
appellant to execute the sale deed. It is also averred in the plaint that
the plaintiff met the defendant several times and requested him to execute
the sale deed. On finding inaction on his part, the suit was filed in
September 1978. This factual position has been highlighted in the plaint
itself. The learned Single Judge after noticing the factual position as
reflected in the averments in the plaint came to hold that the plaint
contains essential facts which lead to inference to the plaintiff’s
readiness and willingness. Para 3 of the plaint indicates that the
plaintiff was always ready to get the sale deed prepared after paying
necessary consideration. In para 4 of the plaint, reference has been made
to the lawyer’s notice calling upon the defendant to execute the sale deed.
In the said paragraph it has also been described as to how after the
lawyer’s notice was issued the plaintiff met the defendant. In para 5 it is
averred that the defendant is bound to execute the sale deed on receiving
the balance amount and the plaintiff was entitled to get the document
executed by the defendant. It is also not in dispute that the balance
amount of the agreed consideration was deposited in court simultaneously to
the filing of the suit.

Xx xx xx
12. The basic principle behind Section 16(c) read with Explanation (ii) is
that any person seeking benefit of the specific performance of contract
must manifest that his conduct has been blemishless throughout entitling
him to the specific relief. The provision imposes a personal bar. The Court
is to grant relief on the basis of the conduct of the person seeking
relief. If the pleadings manifest that the conduct of the plaintiff
entitles him to get the relief on perusal of the plaint he should not be
denied the relief.”
7. But in the present case, there is concurrent finding of fact and
the same is evident from the record that the plaintiff (present appellant)
has failed to perform his part of contract, as such, in our opinion, above
case law is of little help to the plaintiff/appellant, and the courts
below have not erred in law in not granting the relief of specific
performance of contract to the plaintiff in OS.No.37 of 1985.
8. For the reasons as discussed above, we find no illegality in the
judgment and orders challenged before us. Accordingly, both the appeals are
dismissed with costs.
….…………………………………………..J
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

………………………………………………J
(PRAFULLA C. PANT)

NEW DELHI,
SEPTEMBER 8, 2014.

Recovering cheque-bounce money to get more tedious

Dhananjay Mahapatra, TNN | Aug 9, 2014, 02.30AM IST

NEW DELHI: Recovering money if a cheque bounces will now be a lot more tedious and costly. 

In a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court has changed the ground rule under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act to prosecute a person who had presented the cheque which bounced for insufficiency of funds. 

Earlier, a case under Section 138 could be initiated by the holder of the cheque at his place of business or residence. But, a bench of justices TS Thakur, Vikramjit Sen and C Nagappan ruled that the case has to be initiated at the place where the branch of the bank on which the cheque was drawn is located. 
This means, if a man from Delhi gave a cheque drawn on a Delhi bank for buying something in Chennai and it bounced for insufficiency of funds, then the aggrieved person will have to travel all the way from Chennai to Delhi to initiate prosecution under Section 138.
And the judgment would apply retrospectively. This means, lakhs of cases pending in various courts across the country would witness a interstate transfer of cheque bouncing cases. 

Writing the judgment for the 3-judge bench, Justice Sen said: "We are quite alive to the magnitude of the impact that the present decision shall have to possibly lakhs of cases pending in various courts spanning across the country." However, the court said that in those cases where recording of evidence has started after issuance of summons to the accused, would continue to be tried at the place they were instituted. 

"To clarify, regardless of whether evidence has been led before the Magistrate at the pre-summoning stage, either by affidavit or by oral statement, the complaint will be maintainable only at the place where the cheque stands dishonoured," the bench said. 

The bench said: "In this analysis, we hold that the place, situs or venue of judicial inquiry and trial of the offence must logically be restricted to where the drawee bank is located." 

"An interpretation should not be imparted to Section 138 which will render it as a device of harassment, that is, by sending notices (about the bouncing of cheque under Section 138) from a place which has no casual connection with the transaction itself, and/or by presenting cheques at any of the banks where the payee may have an account," the bench said. 

"It is also now manifest that traders and businessmen have become reckless and incautious in extending credit where they would heretofore have been extremely hesitant, solely because of the availability of redress by criminal proceedings," the bench said referring to the rapid increase in institution of cases under Section 138 of NI Act after it was made a criminal offence. 

"Today's reality is that every magistracy is inundated with prosecutions under Section 138 of the NI Act, so much so that the burden is becoming unbearable and detrimental to the disposal of other equally pressing litigation," the court said. 

The court said for filing a criminal case under Section 138 NI Act, the holder of the cheque must have to travel to the place where the branch of the bank on which the cheque was drawn is located. In the alternative, he could institute a case under Section 420 (cheating) at the place of his residence or where he ordinarily carries out business. 

"If the payee succeeds in establishing that the inducement for accepting a cheque which subsequently bounced had occurred where he resides or ordinarily transacts business, he will not have to suffer the travails of journeying to the place where the cheque has been dishonoured," it said. 

"All remedies under the IPC and Crpc are available to such a payee if he chooses to pursue this course of action, rather than a complaint under Section 138 of NI Act. And of course, he can file a suit for recovery wherever the cause of action arises dependent on his choosing," the court said.

Contempt of court: Shouting at court great contempt

Contempt Act sec.14 – Shouting at court – is a great contempt , no notice sec.14 is necessary when done in the presence of High court and Apex court = Ram Niranjan Roy …Appellant Versus State of Bihar and Ors. …Respondents = 2014 (March.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41369ADVOCATEMMMOHAN ⋅ APRIL 2, 2014 ⋅ 

The  appellant

claimed in the application that he was the President of  Bihar  Police  Seva

Sangh, a service association of members of Bihar Police Service.  He  stated

in the application that the transfers and postings of the officers of  Bihar

Police Service were done arbitrarily  in  violation  of  guiding  principles

framed by the  Home  Department  of  Government  of  Bihar.  =

He shouted  and  told  the  court

that he was  intervener  and  that  the  High  Court  has  not  focused  its

attention on the wrong policies of transfers within the  police  department.

He raised his voice with impertinence and declared that the  High  Court  is

not taking up his case wherein he has challenged his  transfer  and  posting

made in the police department.  Learned Judges, then, asked him  whether  he

had been granted leave by the Director General  of  Police  to  present  his

case.  He again shouted at the court and stated  that  he  had  applied  for

leave but whether leave is granted to him or not is not the concern  of  the

court.

  “Section 14 of the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act  no  doubt  contemplates

      issuance of notice and an opportunity to the contemnors to answer  the

      charges in the notice to satisfy the principles  of  natural  justice.

      However, where an incident of the instant nature  takes  place  within

      the presence and sight of the learned  Judges,  the  same  amounts  to

      contempt in the face of the Court and is required to be dealt with  at

      the time of the incident itself. This is necessary for the dignity and

      majesty of the courts to be maintained. When  an  object,  such  as  a

      footwear, is thrown at the Presiding Officer in  a  court  proceeding,

      the object is not to merely scandalise or humiliate the Judge, but  to

      scandalise the institution itself and thereby lower its dignity in the

      eyes of the public.” =

In the ultimate analysis we are  of  the  view  that  the  High  Court

cannot be faulted for punishing the appellant for  contempt  of  court.   No

interference is necessary with the impugned order.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1240 OF 2004
Ram Niranjan Roy …Appellant

Versus

State of Bihar and Ors. …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.
1. A petition was filed in public interest in the Patna High Court being
C.W.J.C. No. 1311 of 2003 by Bihar Vyavsayik Sangharsh Morcha and another
raising several issues relating to law and order problem in the State of
Bihar. The State of Bihar, the Director General of Police of Bihar and
others were made party respondents. The issues raised inter alia were
whether the respondents were duty bound to provide safe and healthy
atmosphere for the proper development of the State or not and whether the
inaction of the respondents was violative of fundamental rights guaranteed
under Articles 19 and 20 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner
inter alia sought direction to the respondents to take measures to stop
exploitation of shopkeepers, dealers, artisans, labourers and industrial
units by officers and police personnel.

2. The High Court issued notices to the respondents pursuant to which
they filed affidavits. On 14/08/2003 the High Court directed the Director
General of Police to make a list of officers from the Station House
Officers upto the Additional Director General of Police, of those who have
remained in their station for more than four years. Relevant paragraphs
from the High Court’s order could be quoted:

“The court suggests the following measures as an ad interim exercise:
a) Let the Director General Police make out a list of officers from
the Station House Officer upto the Additional Director General of
Police, of those who have remained in their station for more than four
years. This dossier is to be supported with information from service
record as to which officer throughout their career has remained at
which station and for how long. Officers who have remained at one
station for over four years must see a posting out within six weeks
from today. These would be officers below the rank of Inspector
General of Police. Staff below the SHOs who have remained at a
particular station beyond three years will be identified by the
District heads of police concerned and their movement will be
undertaken by the Director General of Police.
It must be mentioned that the period of four years is set
because in the normal course of government service, transfers and
postings are made for officers if they have been at a particular
station for more than three years. This order obviously does not
preclude the Director General of Police from making any transfers
should an officer have been at a posting for a lesser period, which is
within normal administrative powers.”

3. In December, 2003, the appellant, who was holding the post of Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Crime Investigation Department (CID), Bihar,
filed an intervention application being I.A.No.5588 of 2003. The appellant
claimed in the application that he was the President of Bihar Police Seva
Sangh, a service association of members of Bihar Police Service. He stated
in the application that the transfers and postings of the officers of Bihar
Police Service were done arbitrarily in violation of guiding principles
framed by the Home Department of Government of Bihar. The appellant
referred to a Writ Application filed by him being C.W.J.C. No.12225 of 1999
against the State of Bihar for an order directing the respondents to
implement the said guiding principles. He stated that the said writ
application has been pending in the High Court for last four years during
which the government has tried to victimize him mala fide. He further
stated that his application should be heard along with the C.W.J.C. No.1311
of 2003. He, therefore, prayed that he may be impleaded in C.W.J.C.
No.1311 of 2003.

4. Admittedly, the appellant is posted at Patna for several years. It
is clear from several orders that the High Court has passed in this matter
that while dealing with the question of law and order situation in Bihar,
the High Court was looking into the State Government’s policy of postings
and transfer of police officers, obviously because that has a direct
bearing on efficiency and rectitude of the police officers. The High
Court even recorded the statement of the Advocate General that certain
transfers of police officers are being effected. The appellant was unhappy
and disturbed about the task undertaken by the High Court. This is evident
from the first paragraph of his intervention application where he has
referred to the order passed by the High Court directing the respondents to
submit a list of officers who have not been removed from their station for
more than four years. It is this that made him intervene in C.W.J.C.
No.1311 of 2003.

5. The appellant wanted his writ application pending in the Patna High
Court to be heard with C.W.J.C. No. 1311 of 2003. We have, therefore,
carefully gone through that petition. The appellant wants to create an
impression that he is fighting for the cause of police officers of Bihar,
but a careful reading of his application makes it clear that he is
espousing his own cause. He has stated that he is continuously posted for
seven years in Cabinet Vigilance Department. He has stated that his
posting in Criminal Investigation Department is wrong and he should be
posted as Sub Divisional Police Officer anywhere in Patna or in any other
proper office such as traffic or transport department in Patna, so that he
may do government duties and take over the responsibility as the President
of Bihar Police Seva Sangh. We shall advert to this Seva Sangh a little
later, but, suffice it to say at this stage that the appellant’s pending
writ application concentrates on his posting and he figures in the prayer
clause also.

6. From the impugned order it appears that on 27/01/2004, the appellant
appeared in-person before the High Court. He shouted and told the court
that he was intervener and that the High Court has not focused its
attention on the wrong policies of transfers within the police department.
He raised his voice with impertinence and declared that the High Court is
not taking up his case wherein he has challenged his transfer and posting
made in the police department. Learned Judges, then, asked him whether he
had been granted leave by the Director General of Police to present his
case. He again shouted at the court and stated that he had applied for
leave but whether leave is granted to him or not is not the concern of the
court. The High Court has observed that he could not show to the court
that leave had been granted to him by the Police Headquarters to argue his
case in-person and challenge transfer policy of the police department. The
High Court has further observed that the appellant baited the court. He
wanted his writ application to be considered out-of-turn on the ground that
it was concerning transfers and postings of police officers. The High
Court, therefore, called for the record, perused the appellant’s
application and found out that it mainly related to his own transfer. The
appellant, then, claimed to be an office bearer of Bihar Police Seva Sangh
and stated that the Police Manual has declared him a member of the
protected staff and he has immunity from transfers and he cannot be
touched. He produced a letter addressed by a Cabinet Minister to the Chief
Minister of Bihar questioning why he was transferred from one establishment
to another, though, within the city. The said letter is quoted in the
impugned order. It appears from the impugned order that the appellant did
not show the slightest remorse nor regret and instead continued to bait the
court and repeat that even the Minister had given him protection and had
granted stay of his transfer. In view of this contumacious behaviour, the
High Court directed that the appellant may be taken into custody by the
Court Officer and the Sergeant and sent to jail as punishment for a day
i.e. for twenty four hours. His intervention application came to be
rejected. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant has approached this
Court.

7. The appellant appeared in-person. Looking to the importance of the
matter, we requested Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor
General, to assist us. As usual, Mr. Luthra has rendered remarkable
assistance to this Court. We heard the appellant at some length. He
submitted that he is not guilty of contempt of court. He submitted that he
has highest regard for the court and he never shouted in the court as
stated in the impugned order. He submitted that he is the President of
the Bihar Police Seva Sangh and is espousing the cause of police officers
in general. On a query made by this Court, whether the Bihar Police Seva
Sangh is a registered society or whether it has got any recognition, he
submitted that the application in that behalf is pending. The Bihar Police
Seva Sangh, however, has not received any recognition so far. He submitted
that the respondents have not refuted any of his contentions by filing any
affidavit in reply. He drew our attention to Section 14 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 and submitted that no opportunity, as contemplated
therein, was given to him to make his defence. He submitted that he had
filed an application for bail. However, no order was passed thereon. He
further submitted that the High Court has unnecessarily cast aspersions on
him. He urged that the impugned order may be set aside.

8. Mr. Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General, on the other hand,
submitted that the appellant is guilty of contempt committed in the face of
the High Court and his case is covered by the judgment of this Court in
Leila David(6) v. State of Maharashtra and Others[1] where this Court
has observed that when a contemnor disrupts the court proceedings by using
offensive language, it is permissible to adopt summary proceedings to
punish him. Mr. Luthra further submitted that the appellant tried to get
his personal application tagged to the Public Interest Litigation petition
for his personal gain and he utilized a letter of a Cabinet Minister to
overawe the court. Besides, he produced incorrect copy of the impugned
order in this Court. He claimed that he had filed bail application when no
such application is found in the record. He has committed breach of
undertaking given in the affidavit filed in this Court. Mr. Luthra
submitted that no leniency should be shown to such a person and the appeal
may, therefore, be dismissed.

9. We have extensively referred to the contents of the impugned order of
the High Court with a purpose. It reflects the appellant’s rude behaviour.
The intemperate language used by the appellant while addressing learned
Judges of the High Court is most objectionable and contumacious. The
appellant is Deputy Superintendent of Police. He claims to be the
President of Bihar Police Seva Sangh. A responsible police officer is not
expected to behave in such undignified and unruly manner in the Court. He
shouted at the Judges. When they asked him whether the police headquarters
had granted him any permission to argue his case in-person and challenge
transfer policy of the police department, he rudely stated that that was
not the concern of the court. He was, however, unable to produce any
permission. Thereafter, he told the court that his application should be
heard along with Public Interest Litigation as it related to postings and
transfers of police officers. On scrutiny, it was found that it mainly
related to his transfer. Thus, he made a wrong statement before the Court.
He, then, stated that he is a protected staff member and has immunity from
transfer and he cannot be touched. He tried to overawe the court by
producing a Cabinet Minister’s letter addressed to the Chief Minister
recommending his case. He did not show any remorse. He did not tender any
apology, but, continued his rude behaviour of shouting at the court and
baiting the court. By this behaviour he lowered the dignity and authority
of the High Court. He challenged the majesty of the High Court by showing
utter disrespect to it. Undoubtedly he committed contempt of the High
Court in its presence and hearing. He is, therefore, guilty of having
committed contempt in the face of the High Court. His case is squarely
covered by Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

10. In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra[2], on a question put to him by a Judge
of the Allahabad High Court, the contemnor, who was an advocate, started
shouting at the Judge and told him that the question could not have been
put to him and he would get the Judge transferred or see that impeachment
motion is brought against him in Parliament. He made more such derogatory
comments. Learned Judge addressed a letter to the Acting Chief Justice
narrating the incident. The Acting Chief Justice forwarded the letter to
the then Chief Justice of India. This Court, then, issued a notice to the
advocate taking a view that there was a prima facie case of the criminal
contempt of the court. This Court treated the said contempt as criminal
contempt committed in the face of the High Court and sentenced the
advocate. Commenting on the contemnor’s conduct, this Court observed as
under:
“To resent the questions asked by a Judge, to be disrespectful to him,
to question his authority to ask the questions, to shout at him, to
threaten him with transfer and impeachment, to use insulting language
and abuse him, to dictate the order that he should pass, to create
scenes in the court, to address him by losing temper are all acts
calculated to interfere with and obstruct the course of justice. Such
acts tend to overawe the court and to prevent it from performing its
duty to administer justice. Such conduct brings the authority of the
court and the administration of justice into disrespect and disrepute
and undermines and erodes the very foundation of the judiciary by
shaking the confidence of the people in the ability of the court to
deliver free and fair justice.”

The above observations of this Court have a bearing on the present
case.

11. In Ranveer Yadav v. State of Bihar[3] the appellant and the
other contemnors disrupted the court proceedings by aggressively exchanging
heated words and created unpleasant scenes in the Court. The decorum and
dignity of the court was so much threatened that the Judge was forced to
rise. This Court held that the offending acts of the appellant constitute
contempt in the face of the court. The relevant paragraph could be quoted.
“The offending acts of the appellant constitute contempt in the face
of court. When contempt takes place in the face of the court, peoples’
faith in the administration of justice receives a severe jolt and
precious judicial time is wasted. Therefore, the offending acts of the
appellant certainly come within the ambit of interference with the due
course of judicial proceeding and are a clear case of criminal
contempt in the face of the court.”

12. The appellant’s contention that no opportunity was given to him to
make his defence must be rejected. In Pritam Pal v. High Court of
Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, through Registrar[4], while dealing with the
nature and scope of power conferred upon this Court and the High Court,
being courts of record under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of
India respectively, this Court observed that the said power is an inherent
power under which the Supreme Court and the High Court can deal with
contempt of itself. The jurisdiction vested is a special one not derived
from any other statute but derived only from Articles 129 and 215. This
Court further clarified that the constitutionally vested right cannot be
either abridged, abrogated or cut down by legislation including the
Contempt of Courts Act.

13. In Leila David(6) this Court has discussed what is contempt in
the face of the Court. In this case, the petitioners made contumacious
allegations in the writ petition and supporting affidavits. Notices were
issued to them as to why contempt proceedings should not
be issued against them. The hearing commenced. The writ
petitioners disrupted the proceedings by using very offensive,
intemperate and abusive language at a high pitch. One of the
petitioners stated that the Judges should be jailed by initiating
proceedings against them and threw footwear at the Judges. The petitioners
stood by what they had said and done in the Court. One of the learned
Judges felt that there was no need to issue notice to the petitioners and
held them guilty of criminal contempt of the court. The other learned
Judge observed that the mandate of Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 must be followed before sending the contemnors to jail. The
question was, therefore, whether the petitioners were entitled to any
opportunity of hearing. The matter was thereafter placed before a three
Judge Bench. The three Judge Bench resolved the difference of opinion and
observed as under:

“Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act no doubt contemplates
issuance of notice and an opportunity to the contemnors to answer the
charges in the notice to satisfy the principles of natural justice.
However, where an incident of the instant nature takes place within
the presence and sight of the learned Judges, the same amounts to
contempt in the face of the Court and is required to be dealt with at
the time of the incident itself. This is necessary for the dignity and
majesty of the courts to be maintained. When an object, such as a
footwear, is thrown at the Presiding Officer in a court proceeding,
the object is not to merely scandalise or humiliate the Judge, but to
scandalise the institution itself and thereby lower its dignity in the
eyes of the public.”

14. Thus, when a contempt is committed in the face of the High Court or
the Supreme Court to scandalize or humiliate the Judge, instant action may
be necessary. If the courts do not deal with such contempt with strong
hand, that may result in scandalizing the institution thereby lowering its
dignity in the eyes of the public. The courts exist for the people. The
courts cherish the faith reposed in them by people. To prevent erosion of
that faith, contempts committed in the face of the court need a strict
treatment. The appellant, as observed by the High Court was not
remorseful. He did not file any affidavit tendering apology nor did he
orally tell the High Court that he was remorseful and he wanted to tender
apology. Even in this Court he has not tendered apology. Therefore, since
the contempt was gross and it was committed in the face of the High Court,
learned Judges had to take immediate action to maintain honour and dignity
of the High Court. There was no question of giving the appellant any
opportunity to make his defence. This submission of the appellant must,
therefore, be rejected.

15. In this Court also the appellant’s behaviour is far from
satisfactory. He told us that he had filed an application for bail in the
High Court, but the High Court did not consider it. The bail application
attached at Annexure-A/6 to the petition is unsigned, supported by unsigned
affidavit bearing no name of the lawyer. We have gone through the entire
record of the High Court and we find that there is no bail application in
the record. Still worse is the tampering of the impugned order. The
appellant has not filed the true copy of the impugned order. The first
sentence of paragraph 4 of the copy of the impugned order filed in this
Court reads as under:

“The intervenor who presents himself in person otherwise a police
officer didn’t shout at the Court that he is an intervenor in this
case….”
However, in the original impugned order the said sentence does not
have the words ‘didn’t shout.’ It reads as under:
“the intervenor who presents himself in person otherwise a police
officer shouted at the Court that he is an intervenor in this
case…….”

Thus, the words ‘didn’t shout’ have replaced the word ‘shouted.’
When we asked for an explanation, the appellant stated that there is no
tampering, but it is merely a typing error. We refuse to accept this
explanation. In this case, by replacing the word ‘shouted’ by the words
‘didn’t shout’ the appellant has changed the entire meaning of the sentence
to suit his case that he did not shout in the court. Thus, he is guilty of
tampering with the High Court’s order and filing it in this Court. This
would, in our opinion, be criminal contempt as defined by Section 2(c) of
the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. There is abundance of judgments of this
Court on this issue. This Court has taken a strict view of such conduct.
We may usefully refer to Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma[5] where in
a transfer petition the contemnor had filed a forged experience certificate
purportedly issued by the Principal of a college from Nagpur. The
Principal filed affidavit stating that the said certificate is forged.
This Court observed that an act which interferes or tends to interfere or
obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice would be
criminal contempt as defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971. This Court further observed that if recourse to falsehood is taken
with oblique motive, the same would definitely hinder, hamper or impede
even flow of justice and would prevent the courts from performing their
legal duties as they are supposed to do. The contemnor was, therefore,
suitably sentenced.

16. In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh[6] a forged/fabricated order of this
court was used for the purpose of conferring some benefits on a group of
persons. This Court took a strict view of the matter and observed as
under:
“The law of contempt of court is essentially meant for keeping the
administration of justice pure and undefiled. It is difficult to
rigidly define contempt. While on the one hand, the dignity of the
court has to be maintained at all costs, it must also be borne in mind
that the contempt jurisdiction is of a special nature and should be
sparingly used. The Supreme Court is the highest court of record and
it is charged with the duties and responsibilities of protecting the
dignity of the court. To discharge its obligation as the custodian of
the administration of justice in the country and as the highest court
imbued with supervisory and appellate jurisdiction over all the lower
courts and tribunals, it is inherently deemed to have been entrusted
with the power to see that the stream of justice in the country
remains pure, that its course is not hindered or obstructed in any
manner, that justice is delivered without fear or favour. To discharge
this obligation, the Supreme Court has to take cognizance of the
deviation from the path of justice. The sole object of the court
wielding its power to punish for contempt is always for the course of
administration of justice. Nothing is more incumbent upon the courts
of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being
misrepresented, nor is there anything more pernicious when the order
of the court is forged and produced to gain undue advantage. Criminal
contempt has been defined in Section 2(c) to mean interference with
the administration of justice in any manner. A false or misleading or
a wrong statement deliberately and wilfully made by a party to the
proceedings to obtain a favourable order would undoubtedly tantamount
to interference with the due course of judicial proceedings. When a
person is found to have utilised an order of a court which he or she
knows to be incorrect for conferring benefit on persons who are not
entitled to the same, the very utilisation of the fabricated order by
the person concerned would be sufficient to hold him/her guilty of
contempt, irrespective of the fact whether he or she himself or
herself is the author of fabrication.”

We respectfully concur with these observations.
17. We shall now turn to the affidavit filed by the appellant in this
Court. He has sworn an affidavit stating that the annexures of the
criminal appeal are the true copies of the originals and the facts stated
in the criminal appeal are true to his knowledge. As already noted by us,
the appellant has tampered with the original impugned order. He stated
that he had filed a bail application in the High Court. The copy of the
said bail application filed in this Court is unsigned and supported by
unsigned affidavit bearing no name of the lawyer. The appellant has not
made the Registrar of the Patna High Court party to the appeal. The
Registrar could have clarified whether any bail application was, in fact,
filed by the appellant. In any case, we have perused the record and we
find that there is no such bail application in the record. Thus, in this
Court the appellant has filed a false affidavit. This amounts to contempt
of this Court.

18. Another very disturbing feature of this case is the manner in which
the appellant flourished in the High Court a Cabinet Minister’s letter
addressed to the Chief Minister recommending his case. We do not want to
comment on the propriety of the Cabinet Minister in addressing such a
letter to the Chief Minister in this case, though this Court has in Prakash
Singh and ors. v. Union of India and ors[7] sought to insulate the
police from political interference. In any case, the appellant should not
have tried to overawe the High Court by producing the said letter. We
deprecate this conduct. We were also taken aback when we were informed
that the appellant is the President of the Bihar Police Seva Sangh. We
are, however, informed that membership of such association is permitted in
the State of Bihar even to the police officers. However, the fact remains
that the said association is not registered.

19. The appellant’s contention that since the respondents have not filed
affidavit, his case is unrebutted is without any merit. A contempt matter
is essentially between the contemnor and the court. On the basis of the
record and the attendant circumstances the court has to decide whether
there is any contempt or not. No doubt, the respondents could have filed
an affidavit, but merely because there is no affidavit, the contemnor
cannot escape his liability. The facts of the case are gross. The
contempt is in the face of the High Court. The fact that the respondents
have not filed affidavit in reply does not dilute the contempt committed
by the appellant.

20. In the ultimate analysis we are of the view that the High Court
cannot be faulted for punishing the appellant for contempt of court. No
interference is necessary with the impugned order. We are also concerned
with the contempt of this Court committed by the appellant. We direct the
appellant to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-. The fine shall be deposited with
the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks from today,
failing which the appellant shall suffer simple imprisonment for seven
days. The amount deposited by the appellant may be utilized for issues
concerning juvenile justice.

21. The appeal is disposed of in the afore-stated terms.
…….……………………………..J.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)

……………………………………J.
(Madan B. Lokur)
New Delhi;
March 31, 2014.

———————–
[1] (2009) 10 SCC 337
[2] (1995) 2 SCC 584
[3] (2010) 11 SCC 493
[4] 1993 Supp (1) SCC 529
[5] (1995) 1 SCC 421
[6] (2001) 5 SCC 501
[7] (2006) 8 SCC 1

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