SC rejects PIL for judges' post-retirement cooling-off period

The Supreme Court Wednesday dismissed a PIL seeking cooling-off period for the retired judges of the apex court before they take up next assignment.

The issue of cooling-off period is being debated by the legal fraternity after former Chief Justice of India P Sathasivanm accepted the governorship of Kerala shortly after his retirement.

The petition argued that a retired judge of the apex court cannot practice before any court in the country and judges accepting to work with the government poorly reflected on the independence of judiciary.

The apex court bench of Chief Justice HL Dattu, Justice SA Bobde and Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre dismissed the plea by the petitioner Ali Bangalore alias Muhammed Ali that any such engagement by the retired judges with the government, directly or indirectly influenced the working of the judiciary and its independence.

Counsel for petitioner Muhammed Ali told the court the former judges accepting assignment with the government was not proper as it directly or indirectly influenced the working of the judiciary and its independence - which is the basic feature of the constitution.

Counsel referred to various newspapers reports, including that of the Law Commission, in support of his contention.

Interestingly, on his last working day in the Supreme Court, former Chief Justice RM Lodha advocated two years’ cooling-off period after retirement before the judges of the higher judiciary could pick up any assignment with the government.

SC collegium withdraws 12 names for Madras HC

 Dhananjay Mahapatra,TNN | Feb 15, 2014, 03.54 AM IST

NEW DELHI: In an unprecedented move, theSupreme Court collegium headed by Chief Justice P Sathasivam on Friday withdrew the 12 names it had recommended to the Centre for appointment as judges in Madras High Court, taking into account the massive controversy it had sparked over the selection criteria. 

The animosity caused by the 12 names was such that during hearing of a petition challenging the selection criteria in Madras HC, a sitting judge of the HC, Justice C S Karnan, walked into the court room and openly sided with the issue raised in the petition. 

Justice Karnan had made an appearance before a division bench of Justice V Dhanapalan and Justice K K Sasidharan which was hearing senior advocate R Gandhi's PIL and said he would file an affidavit describing the selection as unfair. The bench had ordered status quo on appointment. The HC had challenged its own interim order before the Supreme Court. 

At a time when the apex court was seized of the matter on the judicial side, the collegium of three senior-most judges of the Supreme Court headed by Justice Sathasivam decided to withdraw the names and send it back to the chief justice of the high court for reconsideration. 

These names had come to the apex court collegium when Justice R K Agrawal was chief justice of the high court. The collegium based its decision to withdraw the 12 names on two developments - one, there had been unprecedented opposition to the recommendation and second, Justice Agrawal was elevated to the Supreme Court as a judge.

The collegium sent its decision withdrawing the December recommendation to law minister Kapil Sibal on Friday evening and said it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the selection of the 12 names. 

It said since Justice Agrawal had been elevated as a judge of the Supreme Court, in fairness of the scheme of things, the names should be considered afresh by the new chief justice. 

The Supreme Court on January 13 had stayed the HC's January 8 order directing status quo in the appointment process of the 12 as judges of Madras HC. It had also restrained the HC from proceeding further with the hearing on Gandhi's PIL and asked why it should not be transferred to the SC. 

Appearing for the Madras HC registrar general, who had appealed against the HC order, attorney general G E Vahanvati had said the SC had settled the law on this issue to rule that the suitability of a person to be appointed as judge could not be questioned before the HC or the SC.

The AG had said, "The process is such that it could not be questioned judicially. Judicial review could be undertaken only on two grounds lack of eligibility of a person to be appointed as a judge and lack of proper consultation among the constitutional authorities part of the process of selection of judges." 
Referring to the surprise intervention by a sitting judge of the HC during the proceedings, Vahanvati had said, "It is a serious matter." Of the 12 names recommended earlier for appointment as judges, 10 are practicing advocates and two are from subordinate judiciary. 

Redeeming the Supreme Court

BL Anup Surenranath 28 Jan 2014

The Supreme Court has taken the position that it cannot be expected to abandon its role of being the guardian of the fundamental rights of all persons within the territory of India

In a span of about 45 days, the Supreme Court of India has delivered two judgments that have received diametrically opposite reactions — one will count among the Court’s most poorly reasoned judgments while the other is likely to be heralded as one of its finest for its clarity and fidelity to earlier decisions. The contrast between Justice Singhvi’s judgment upholding the criminalisation of homosexuality and that of Chief Justice Sathasivam affirming the rights of mercy-rejected death row prisoners could not be starker. After Justices Singhvi and Mukhopadhaya upheld the constitutionality of Section 377 of the IPC in Suresh Kumar Koushal, the credibility of the Court as a counter-majoritarian institution had suffered a serious setback. However, the Chief Justice, along with Justices Ranjan Gogoi and Shiva Kirti Singh, has done a remarkable job in partly restoring the credibility of the Court through a thoroughly reasoned judgment in Shatrughan Chauhan v Union of India. InChauhan, the Court has concluded that inordinate delay in the rejection of mercy petitions of death row convicts amounted to torture and that it is a sufficient basis, in and of itself, to commute a sentence of death to life imprisonment. It is not just about the contrast in outcomes in these two cases but the processes adopted by these two judgments will go a long way in determining the position they will occupy in the judicial history of this country.

The similarities

Any comparison between the two judgments must begin by acknowledging complexities involved in both cases. The legal response to homosexuality in India through Section 377 has been on the statute books for over 150 years. Though attitudes towards homosexuality have undergone significant changes, it would only be fair to acknowledge that it is nonetheless a deeply divisive issue in India. It would also be a fair assessment that the death penalty and treatment that must be accorded to those sentenced to death are extremely polarising issues. The case before the Supreme Court in Chauhan was particularly delicate because the President had rejected mercy to all 15 prisoners before the Court. However, all 15 prisoners had returned to the Supreme Court seeking enforcement of their right to life on the ground that their suffering on death row due to the inordinate delay by the executive (ranging between 11 to 1.5 years) entitled them to commutation of their death sentence. It must also be noted that the Supreme Court in both cases was being asked to intervene in situations where other organs of the state had already made certain determinations. In Koushal, the legislature had made the political determination that homosexuality would be criminalised by not repealing Section 377. Similarly, in Chauhan, the executive, through the President of India, had rejected all the mercy petitions.

Differences

Though the challenges were similar in many ways, there is an unbelievable contrast in the manner in which the Supreme Court responded. In Koushal, the judgment authored by Justice Singhvi does not address the legal issues that were at the heart of the constitutional challenges to Section 377. There are the poorly argued sections on equality under Article 14 and the right to life under Article 21 while completely ignoring the arguments on the protection against discrimination under Article 15. The shortcomings of Koushal are evident when it is compared to the judgment of the Delhi High Court on Section 377 in Naz Foundation. There are established constitutional doctrines to test whether a provision of law is discriminatory and violates the right to equality under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution, none of which finds any serious engagement in Koushal. None of this is about whether one supports Section 377 or not. It is about adopting a sound judicial technique — it is about identifying precise and relevant questions; it is about applying constitutional doctrines to those questions in a rigorous manner; it is about reasoned conclusions. Rights adjudication is not about judges merely taking a decision and that is what distinguishes them from politicians. Unfortunately, the judgment in Koushalfails on all these grounds. More than the unacceptable outcome, what must worry us more is that the judgment in Koushal reads like a thinly veiled political decision.

However, the judgment in Chauhan articulates a very difficult legal issue precisely and clarifies the decision of a five-judge bench in Triveniben (1989) on it. While clarifying and relying on Triveniben, there is thorough constitutional reasoning in Chauhan that led the Court to come to the conclusion that inordinate delay in disposing of mercy petitions amounts to torture and that the nature of the crime must have no relevance in that determination. The issue about the nature of the crime was particularly important in the context of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bhullar. In Bhullar, the Supreme Court had concluded that those sentenced to death for terrorist offences could not invoke the argument about inordinate delay in disposing of mercy petitions due to the nature of crimes. While relying on Trivenibento come to the conclusion that the classification of terrorist and non-terrorist offences in the context of inordinate delay in disposing of mercy petitions is constitutionally invalid, the judges, in Chauhan,have not created new jurisprudence and have only clarified the content and application of earlier judgments. There is tremendous judicial skill in the manner in which they have analysed earlier judgments and applied constitutional doctrines.

Challenges and responses

The most obvious difference in the two judgments is the approach to the target groups concerned. InKoushal, the perception that only very few homosexuals have been prosecuted under Section 377 was of tremendous significance to the judges. A numerical approach to rights enforcement is rather baffling and quite alien to the jurisprudence developed by the Indian Supreme Court. In Chauhan, despite dealing with a very small group of individuals (those death row prisoners whose mercy petitions have been rejected) and in particular a group which is often hated and reviled, the judges emphatically held that the protections in the Constitution are available to every individual, without exception. Perhaps the greatest merit of the decision in Chauhan is the rejection of the argument that retribution or strong moral disapproval of actions by death row prisoners can be used to deny them constitutionally protected rights.

As far as institutional relations between different organs of the State are concerned, the Supreme Court, in Koushal, ruled that Parliament was free to amend Section 377 and decriminalise homosexuality. However, if the law were to stand, the judges felt there was no constitutional infirmity. There is a palpable reluctance to meaningfully scrutinise a law on a divisive issue where the political class has made a choice. However, in Chauhan, the Supreme Court squarely addresses the warning that the Court might be overstepping its jurisdiction because the President had already rejected the mercy petitions of all 15 prisoners. The Court is clear that it is not questioning the power of the President to reject mercy petitions but is rather interested and competent to go into the issue of whether the executive violated the rights of the death row convicts due to the inordinate delay. The Supreme Court has taken the position that it cannot be expected to abandon its role of being the guardian of the fundamental rights of all persons within the territory of India, whoever they might be.

The Supreme Court, in Chauhan, had the courage to undertake significant course correction by clarifying the ruling in Triveniben. As efforts to decriminalise homosexuality gather pace again with the scheduled review of Koushal this week, the Supreme Court must see the fact that critical questions about the constitutionality of Section 377 have not been addressed in Koushal. If the review petition does not result in correction of the errors in Koushal, the Chief Justice of India (due to retire in April 2014) will find himself in an interesting position. After having delivered a judgment that has gone a long way to restore the credibility of the Court after Koushal, the Chief Justice will have to decide if he wants to refer the constitutionality of Section 377 to a larger bench. Given the intensity of his commitment to the rule of law as displayed in Chauhan, it would be surprising if Chief Justice Sathasivam lets the poorly reasoned judgment in Koushal be a blot on his tenure as Chief Justice of India. He only needs to look as far as the Delhi High Court’s judgment on Section 377 in Naz Foundation to realise what an alternative legacy could look like.

(Anup Surendranath is an assistant professor of law and director of the Death Penalty Research Project at the National Law University, Delhi.)

SC retains bar on Subrata Roy's foreign trips

BS Reporter  |  New Delhi  January 10, 2014 Last Updated at 00:36 IST


Asks Sahara to reveal source of Rs 20k cr claimed to have been returned to investors

Retaining the bar on Sahara group chief Subrata Roy's visits abroad, the Supreme Court on Thursday asked his two real estate companies to disclose in two weeks the source of the Rs 20,000 crore these claimed to have refunded to the investors in their optionally fully-convertible debentures (OFCDs).

The companies, Sahara Housing Investment and Sahara India Real Estate,  maintain these have repaid 90 per cent of the investors. If that was so, the judges said, the source should have been reflected in their balance sheets.

The court had ordered the group to make refunds two years ago but, according to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi), that has not been done.

The bench headed by K S Radhakrishnan told the Sahara counsel the companies would have to return the money. "Now we will call the registrar of companies to find the source of money and even order a CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation) inquiry into the whole affair," the judge said.

"The court is not helpless; we will see our order is fully complied with," the bench said. The judges said the order to return the money was passed two years ago and nine months ago Sebi had moved the court for contempt action. "We don't want to burden Sebi any more," the judges said, threatening to take the matter to the Registrar of Companies, which, they said, was doing little in the matter.

"We have given maximum indulgence. We are driven to call the registrar," the court said. "If you take the history of the case, there is inconsistency in every affidavit filed by the Sahara companies. We have been most generous in this matter, but you don't appreciate our indulgence."

Though the court expected the companies to provide sufficient securities in the nature of title deeds of assets to guarantee the refund, Sebi counsel Arvind Datar on Thursday said all the property titles were shaky. The Aamby Valley project in Maharashtra was riddled with litigation and false power-of-attorney transactions, for which a key person had been arrested. Also, the entire project was without environment clearance and litigation for this was pending, he said.

Some other properties in other parts of the country had also been valued exorbitantly to meet the court's demand for adequate security. In several cases, the property was bought for a sum and the valuation showed more than 50 times appreciation over 10 years. Some deeds were not traceable, Datar said.

In view of the objections of Sebi about the title deeds, there was no arguments about Roy going out on business as the permission was conditional on sufficient security to the satisfaction  of Sebi.


Sebi had raised contempt action with regard to Sahara’s advertisements in all leading papers about the pending cases.  The court had at last hearing ordered publication  of apology in all the papers with equal prominence. The judges said in a lighter vein that they read all the newspapers and they have not been able to spot any apology so far. It should be done before Janauray 28, when the case will be heard again, after the production of title deeds with adequate security.

Explain source of refunds, SC tells Sahara

BS Reporter  |  New Delhi  

December 11, 2013 Last Updated at 22:50 IST

The Supreme Court on Wednesday directed Sahara India Real EstateCorp (SIRECL) and Sahara Housing Invest Corp (SHICL) to explain the source of the money they claimed to have refunded to investors in their optionally fully convertible debentures (OFCDs).

The SC also directed the companies to file the relevant official records such as those to the ministry of corporate affairs and the income tax returns, in support of these refund claims.

The judges also rapped Sahara for its series of advertisements in recent weeks against the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi). It directed the group to readvertise a withdrawal of the allegations with the same prominence, in the same media.

NO END TO SAHARA’S TROUBLESOUBLES

The Supreme Court on Wednesday directed Sahara India Real Estate Corp and Sahara Housing Invest Corp to explain the source of money they claimed to have refunded to investors in the optionally fully convertible debentures The court also directed the firms to file the relevant official records such as filings with the ministry of corporate affairs and income tax returns in support of these refunds Slams Sahara for issuing advertisements. It has directed Sahara to issue an apology in similar prominence and in all the papers the advertisement was issued Sebi has issued a legal notice against Sahara separately for the 'sarkari goonda' remark against it. It has also written to banks to freeze Sahara accounts No relief for Subrata Roy, despite submitting title deeds including three Aamby valley properties worth Rs 11,000 crore Sebi to check veracity of deeds, claims Next hearing in January

The two companies had raised Rs 24,029 crore by issuing OFCDs and the SC had told them to first stop the sale of these and then to remit the entire amount to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi), for returning to the depositors. They then claimed all but Rs 2,610 crore had already been directly refunded.

The duo had deposited a sum of Rs 5,120 crore, including a “buffer”, with Sebi to settle with the remaining investors.
On Wednesday, the Sahara group showed evidence of 3,268 title deeds of properties in 71 locations but Sebi counsel Arvind Datar said this process assumed the refunds were already made and the group should not be made to pay twice. “If so, how did you refund? Rs 19,000 crore is a colossal amount. Even large groups would find it difficult to mobilise. Which are the properties you sold? Where did the money come from?” he asked.

He told the judges Sebi had written in May for these details but these were yet to be given by the group. The bench of K S Radhakrishnan and J S Khehar then passed an order directing the companies to file all the documents in support of the refunds as required by the Sebi letter. The order also directs Sebi to verify the title deeds and valuation reports given.

Earlier CA Sundaram, representing Sahara group chief Subrata Roy, moved an application to end the court’s November 21 order directing his client not to leave the country. “There is no urgent need to vary it,” Radhakrishnan said.

Sundaram said the 3,268 title deeds of properties in 71 locations comprised an area of 7,161 acres and were worth Rs 20,172 crore. The bulk of the value came from three lots of land within the group’s Aamby Valley luxury township project, off the Mumbai-Pune Highway. The land parcels located in Pomgaon and Kumheri villages were said to be worth Rs 11,000 crore , according to valuation reports given by the group.

The Aamby valley title deeds covered a total area of 1,747 acres. The group also gave title deeds for land in Faridabad (Rs 423 crore), Noida (Rs 370 crore), Muzzafarnagar (Rs 307 crore) and Haridwar (Rs 213 crore). The 71 locations included Ajmer, Aligarh, Kanpur, Jhansi, Kochi, Coimbatore and Tiruchi, he said.

The court took severe exception to newspaper advertisements issued by Sahara after the November SC hearing, calling Sebi a “sarkari goonda” and alleging a witch hunt. Radhakrishnan said, “We are taking this very, very seriously. Don’t take us for a ride. You are already on contempt; why are you precipitating the issue?”

Khehar added Sebi was only implementing the court order and “What you are telling them, you are indirectly telling us.” And so, he said, an apology had to be published by the group with the same prominence and in all papers in which the original advertisement against Sebi was published by Sahara. Datar informed the court the regulator has sent a legal notice to Sahara for their disparaging remarks.

The court refused to entertain a request from SIRECL counsel S Ganesh to reverse a Sebi move to freeze bank accounts of group companies. “On December 4, they have written to banks to freeze all our accounts. We are running businesses. It is difficult.”

However, Khehar said Sahara’s lawyers were to blame. “All they had to do was comply with our order. But you advised them wrongly,” he said.

Medical negligence: SC asks hospital to pay Rs 5.96 cr to NRI doctor

FP: 4 mts ago : 24 Oct 2013

New Delhi: The Supreme Court today awarded a whopping Rs 5.96 crore as compensation to be paid by Kolkata-based AMRI Hospital and three doctors to a US-based Indian-origin doctor for medical negligence which led to the death of his wife in 1998.

A bench of justices SJ Mukhopadhaya and V Gopala Gowda asked the hospital and the three doctors to pay the amount within eight weeks to Kunal Saha, an Ohio-based AIDS researcher.

The National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission (NCDRC) in 2011 had awarded Rs 1.73 crore to the doctor whose wife Anuradha Saha died in 1998 following faulty treatment administered at the hospital. 

Raising the amount of compensation, the apex court also asked the hospital to pay an interest at the rate of six per cent to Saha.

The court said out of the total compensation amount, Dr Balram Prasad and Dr Sukumar Mukherjee will pay Rs 10 lakh each and Dr Baidyanath Halder will have to pay Rs five lakh to Saha within eight weeks.

The rest of the amount, along with the interest, will be paid by the hospital, the apex court said, adding that a compliance report be filed before it after payment of the compensation amount.

NCDRC had fixed the compensation on a direction by the apex court, which had referred Saha’s appeal to it while holding the three doctors and the hospital culpable to civil liability for medical negligence which had led to the death of Anuradha.

Anuradha, herself a child psychologist, had come to her home town Kolkata in March 1998 on a summer vacation. She complained of skin rashes on April 25 and consulted Dr Sukumar Mukherjee, who, without prescribing any medicine, simply asked her to take rest.

As rashes reappeared more aggressively on May 7, 1998, Dr Mukherjee prescribed Depomedrol injection 80 mg twice daily, a step which was later faulted by experts at the apex court.

After administration of the injection, Anuradha’s condition deteriorated rapidly following which she had to be admitted at AMRI on May 11 under Dr Mukherjee’s supervision.

Saha, in his plea before NCDRC, had demanded a record Rs 77 crore as compensation.

While awarding Rs 1,72,87,500 as compensation to Saha for his wife’s death, NCDRC had held the US doctor responsible for contributing to the negligence committed by the three Kolkata doctors and the hospital and had ordered 10 per cent deduction in the amount of compensation making it Rs 1.55 crore.

Another doctor involved in Anuradha’s treatment, Abani Roy Chowdhury had passed away during the pendency of the case.

As Anuradha’s condition failed to improve, she was flown to Breach Candy Hospital, Mumbai, where she was found to be suffering from a rare and deadly skin disease–Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (TEN). She died there on May 28, 1998.

Saha had then filed a criminal as well as civil case against the doctors and both the hospitals on the ground that they were grossly negligent in her treatment leading to her death.

In 2009, though the apex court absolved the doctors and the hospitals of criminal liability for medical negligence, it had held them culpable of civil liabilities and referred Saha’s plea for compensation under provisions of the Consumer Protection Act to NCDRC, which, had in 2006 dismissed, the
case.

After the NCDRC judgement, Saha had again moved the apex court and the three doctors had also filed an appeal before it.

NCDRC, in its judgement, had stipulated that AMRI and Dr. Mukherjee would pay Rs 40.4 lakh each to Saha, while two other doctors, Halder and Prasad, would pay Rs 26.93 lakh each to him.

No quota in super-specialty posts: SC

Dhananjay Mahapatra, TNN | Jul 19, 2013, 05.13 AM IST


NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court on Thursday blocked caste-based reservations in appointments to faculty posts in premier All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) saying constitution benches of the court had repeatedly and concurrently warned against reservation at super-specialty level. 

"There were certain services and posts where either on account of the nature of duties attached to them or the level in the hierarchy at which they stood, merit alone counts. In such, situations, it cannot be advised to provide for reservations" a five-judge constitution bench of Chief Justice Altamas Kabir and Justices S S Nijjar, Ranajan Gogoi, M Y Eqbal and Vikramjit Sen said quoting from the judgment a nine-judge bench delivered in Indira Sawhney case. 

The court quoting from Indira Sawhney verdict, which had upheld the 27% reservation for OBCs in Central services, said: "In certain services in respect of certain posts, application of rule of reservation may not be advisable in regard to various technical posts including posts in super specialty in medicine, engineering and other scientific and technical posts." 

The Faculty Association of AIIMS and Resident Doctors Association, which had challenged the reservation scheme being applied to appointments in premier institutes faculty positions, had argued that that all these posts required qualification in a super-specialty course. 

AIIMS, however, cited Eklavya tale of Mahabharat and supported continuance of reservation for appointments in faculty positions in AIIMS saying without quota the Eklavyas would always lose to Arjun who had the backing of the traditional system. The Centre, too, supported the stand of AIIMS. 

What prevailed upon the bench headed by the Justice Kabir was the Indra Sawhney case, which while stressing the relevance and significance of merit at the stage of initial recruitment, had cautioned that reservation too implied selection of less meritorious person. 

While giving due weight to AIIMS and government argument that SC, ST and OBCs needed social uplift through reservation, the bench said it could not overlook the plausible view that "the very concept of reservation implies mediocrity and we will have to take not of the caution indicated in Indra Sawhney's case." 

After reiterating the caution and subscribing to the judicially settled view that there could be no reservation in the super-specialty posts, the bench said: "We impress upon the central and State governments to take appropriate steps in accordance with the views expressed in Indra Sawhney's case and in this case, as also the other decisions referred to above, keeping in mind the provisions of Article 335 of the Constitution." 

Article 335 of the Constitution provided: "The claims of the members of the SCs and STs shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of Union or of a State."

SC: Borrowers must approach tribunal, not high court

Source : Business Standard:M J Antony / New Delhi February 14, 2011, 0:55 IST


The Supreme Court (SC) stated last week a borrower and his guarantors who have been served with a notice under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act has a remedy under the Act and should not rush to the high court. In this case, Kanaiyalal vs State of Maharashtra, State Bank of India advanced loans against mortgage of certain property. The loan was declared as non-performing asset and the bank proceeded to take over the mortgaged property. The guarantors moved the Bombay high court against the bank’s move. It rejected the petition stating they had tried to avail of the remedy earlier by moving the debt recovery tribunal The excise commissioner appealed to the SC. It quashed the tribunal’s order.


Permanently fixed furniture too subject to excise 

The SC ruled last week central excise duty can be levied on furniture permanently fixed to the walls or ground. It set aside the decision of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, which took a contrary view in the case, Commissioner vs Mehta & Co. This Mumbai company was engaged in interior decoration of luxury hotels. It entered into turn-key contracts with its clients and furniture was part of the work contract. When the revenue authorities demanded excise duty, it protested the woodwork was carried out in the premises of the hotels and they were permanent fixtures. They cannot be removed without causing damage to the goods or cannibalisation. When the contention was rejected, the firm moved the tribunal, which accepted its argument.

A director of a company should not be dragged to a criminal court when documents prove he was not responsible for issuing cheques which were dishonoured, the SC stated last week. The Calcutta high court had asked a former director of Rifa Healthcare (India) who had resigned from the company to stand trial for the issuance of 18 cheques. He showed from documents he had left the company and therefore the case against him should be quashed. But the high court insisted it was his duty to show the trial court he had indeed quit the company. Therefore, he should face the trial first. He appealed to the SC against the order. The SC set aside the ruling in the case, Harshendra Kumar vs Rebatilata Kole, stating it was evident from the records of the company and the registrar of the companies he had left the firm at the time of issuing the cheques.

Appeal over violation of rules on storing imported good

The SC last week dismissed the appeal of M/s SBEC Sugar Ltd against the Bombay HC order allowing the customs authorities to charge dues for keeping imported goods in the warehouse beyond the permitted time. The firm had imported capital goods for its unit. The goods were kept in the warehouse under bond. After the expiry of the period, the firm applied for extension of the facility. Meanwhile, the government enlarged the Export Promotion Capital Goods Scheme to cover agro-based industries. The sugar firm availed of this facility and claimed exemption. The authorities rejected the request. The importer moved the high court, and later appealed to the SC, without success. The SC judgment clarified the benefit of exemption granted under the export promotion scheme would not be available to the firm.

Petition on trademark dismissed

The Madras high court last week rejected the petition of Crompton Greaves Ltd seeking a trade mark injunction against Salzer Electronics Ltd in a dispute over the use of the logo CG. Salzer, an Indian company, was a third party manufacturer for Crompton Greaves of electrical goods. Later, Salzer manufactured similar goods for a British firm, Europa Component & Equipment plc with trademark MCG. The latter trade mark is owned by a European company called Motor Control and Industrial Switch Gear.

Salzer sent its goods with MCG mark to UK. The high court stated that since the goods were sent to UK on Europa’s orders, with a mark registered there and to be sold abroad, there was no cause for injunction. Moreover, the mark was not visible on the face of the goods unless the outer casing was removed.