N.S. John Vs S B T

IN THE DEBT RECOVERY APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT CHENNAI

DATED THE 26^TH OCTOBER, 2005

PRESENT:  HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K. GNANAPRAKASAM

CHAIRPERSON

MA-131/2005

(IA-460/2004 in OA-366/2002:  DRT, Ernakulam)

BETWEEN:

N.S. John,

Nediyamannil,

Vallikode-Kottayam,

Pathanamthitta District,

Kerala.

…  Appellant

AND

SBT

Pathanamthitta, Kerala.

Represented by its Chief Manager

…  Respondent

Counsel for Appellant:  Mr. Isac T. Paul for M/s. Peter & Karunakar

Counsel for Respondent:  Mr. Girish Kumar

:  O R D E R  :

1.         This Appeal is directed against the Order dated 4.2.2005 passed by the DRT, Ernakulam, in IA-460/2004 in OA-366/2002.

2.         The Appellants are the defendants in the OA and they have filed an Application in IA-460/2004, to condone the delay of 446 days in filing the Reply Statement and the same came to be dismissed by the DRT by its Order dated 4.2.2005, and the same is under challenge in this Appeal.

3.         I have heard the Learned Advocate for the Appellant and Respondent and also perused the relevant papers placed before this Tribunal. 

4.         The Appellant in the Affidavit filed before the DRT had stated that they were directed to file the Written Statement within two weeks from 20.11.2002 and they did not do so.  The Written Statement was filed on 24.2.2004 and there was a delay of 446 days in filing the Written Statement.  The delay was explained in the Affidavit by stating that the defendants were trying to settle the claim with the Applicant Bank and the defendants were optimistic of settling the claim and unfortunately the defendants could not raise sufficient funds from the expected sources and hence they were constrained to file the Written Statement and only in the said circumstances, there was a delay and the said delay was neither willful nor wanton.

5.         The Respondent Bank herein filed a Counter opposing the said Petition stating that the defendants after receipt of the summons appeared through their Advocate on 7.10.2002 and four weeks time was given to file the Written Statement and the case was posted on 20.11.2002.  Subsequently, the case was posted to 24.4.2003, 18.7.2003, 17.10.2003, for filing the Written Statement of the defendants.  The case was then posted to 1.12.2003 for want of time and it was adjourned to 9.2.2004 for the Proof Affidavit of the Applicant Bank and the Bank also filed the Proof Affidavit on 15.10.2003 and finally the case was posted on 25.2.2004 and only in the meanwhile, the defendants filed the Written Statement. The Bank does not admit the effort said to have taken by the defendants to settle the matter.  The defendants have also not filed any Application for extension of time as provided under Rule-12 of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993, and hence prayed for the dismissal of the Petition.

6.         The Ld. PO of the DRT after taking into consideration all the aspects and after having heard both sides, came to the conclusion that Order-8 Rule-1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) as amended with effect from 1.7.2002, states that, “The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence.”  The proviso thereto says that, “Where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons.”  The Tribunal was also guided by the decision of the three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant & others, Appellants Vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi, Respondent – (2002) 6 SCC 635, wherein it was held that, “Under Rule-1 of Order-8 of the Code, there is a legislative mandate that written statement of defence is to be filed within 30 days and if there is failure to file the Written Statement within the stipulated time, the Court can at the most extend further period of 60 days and no more.”  After having observed so, the DRT came to the conclusion that it has no power to extend the period for filing written statement beyond 90 days from the date of service of summons on the defendant.  Reliance was also made to Sub-section (4) of Section-19 of the RDDB&FI Act, 1993, and Sub-section (5) of the said Act was also taken into consideration.  The DRT ultimately placing reliance upon the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant & others, held that time beyond 90 days from the date of service of summons cannot be granted to the defendants to file the Written Statement and dismissed the Petition of the defendants.  Aggrieved by the same, the 2^nddefendant has preferred this Appeal.

7.         The Ld. Advocate for the Appellant would contend that they have been under the bonafide impression that the matter could be settled and they have been approaching the Respondent Bank and as they could not settle the matter, they have filed the Written Statement and only in the said circumstances, there was a delay and the said delay was neither willful nor wanton.  It is further submitted that the post of Presiding Officer was kept vacant somewhere between November, 2002 upto August, 2003.  It is also one of the reasons, which prevented them from filing the Written Statement.  But however, it is prayed that the Appellant have filed the Written Statement alongwith the Application to condone the delay and they may be given an opportunity to defend the case, as they have got a good and valid defence.

8.         On the contrary, the Ld. Advocate for the Respondent Bank would contend that the Appellant was not at all diligent in defending the case.  When the Tribunal granted two weeks time on 20.11.2002, the defendants could have filed the Written Statement or at least within a reasonable time thereafter, but they have not done so.  The defendants have deliberately delayed filing the Written Statement with a view only to protract the proceedings.  It is also further submitted that the reason given by the Appellant that just because the post of Presiding Officer was vacant for some time, they did not file the Written Statement, cannot be a good and valid ground for non-filing of the Written Statement.  Nothing prevented the defendants from filing the Written Statement.

9.         After having heard the Ld. Advocate for the Appellant and Respondent, it is made out that no doubt, Order-8 Rule-1 C.P.C. states that the defendant shall present a Written  Statement of his defence within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him.  This amendment was introduced to the C.P.C. by the amended Act 46 of 1999, which came into force on 1.7.2002.  Though Section-22(1) of the RDDB&FI Act, 1993 states that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the C.P.C., 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, it is well settled, as it has been rightly observed by the DRT also that the Tribunal can act upon the provisions contained in the Code and can even go beyond the Code so long as it passes orders in conformity with the principles of natural justice, as it has been held in the case of Allahabad Bank, Calcutta Vs. Radha Krishna Maity & Others – (1999) 6 SCC 755.  The 30 days period as provided under Order-8 Rule-1 CPC, could be extended upto a period of 90 days as stated in the proviso to Order-8 Rule-1, which states, “Where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons.”  Following the proviso and also the Judgement rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. J.J. Merchant’s case, the DRT came to the conclusion that the Appellant filed the Written Statement after a period of 90 days and, therefore, that cannot be entertained, and dismissed the Petition.

10.       Now the Ld. Advocate for the Appellant relies upon the case of Kailash, Appellant Vs. Nanhku & others, Respondents – (2005) 4 SCC 480, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the Judgement delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant Vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi – (2002) 6 SCC 635, and had held, “A careful reading of the judgment shows that the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 CPC did not directly arise for consideration before the Court and to that extent the observations made by the Court are obiter.”   It was further observed that the attention of the Court was not invited to the earlier decision of that Court in Topline Shoes Ltd. case – (2002) 6 SCC 33.  Ultimately, their Lordships came to the conclusion that, “A prayer seeking time beyond 90 days for filing the Written Statement ought to be made in writing.  In its judicial discretion exercised in well settled parameters the Court may indeed put the defendants on terms including imposition of compensatory costs and may also insist on an affidavit, medical certificate or other documentary evidence (depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case) being annexed with the application seeking extension of time so as to convince the court that the prayer was founded on grounds which do exist.”  Ultimately it was held (Paras 44&45), “The extension of time shall be only by way of exception and for reasons to be recorded in writing, howsoever brief they may be, by the court.  In no case, shall the defendant be permitted to seek extension of time when the court is satisfied that it is a case of laxity or gross negligence on the part of the defendant or his counsel.  The court may impose costs for dual purpose: (i) to deter the defendant from seeking any extension of time just for the asking, and (ii) to compensate the plaintiff for the delay and inconvenience caused to him.

            Howsoever, no straitjacket formula can be laid down except that the observance of time schedule contemplated by Order 8 Rule 1 shall be the rule and departure therefrom an exception, made for satisfactory reasons only.  We hold that Order 8 Rule 1, though couched in mandatory form, is directory being a provision in the domain of processual law.”

            This Judgement was not placed before the DRT, Ernakulam, when it passed Order on 4.2.2005, and only in the said circumstances, the DRT based upon the earlier Judgement of Dr. J.J. Merchant & others, held that time for filing the Written Statement cannot be extended beyond 90 days from the date of service of summons on the defendants.  But now, the pronouncement in Kailash’s case: (2005) 4 SCC 480, enables the Court to extend the time for filing of Written Statement even beyond 90 days, of course, for valid reasons.  In the given case, the Appellant has stated they were optimistic of settling the claim and only on that ground they were not able to file the Written Statement in time.  Though it does not appear to be satisfactory, but however, taking note of the lenient view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, I am inclined to condone the delay in filing the Written Statement, but however, on cost, as the Appellant was not diligent in filing the Written Statement not only within the time stipulated, but even thereafter also.

11.       In the above said circumstances, the Appeal is allowed on condition that the Appellant shall deposit a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) by way of costs before DRT, Ernakulam, by Demand Draft taken in the name of “Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund”, on or before 16.11.2005, failing which the Order passed today shall stand erased and recalled.  On such deposit, the DRT, Ernakulam, is directed to send the Demand Draft to the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund, at Delhi.

(Dictated to PS in the open court today 26.10.2005, typed by him & order signed by me)

                                                                                                                        Sd/-

[ JUSTICE  K. GNANAPRAKASAM ]

CHAIRPERSON

NPAs have increased from Rs.59,927 cr to Rs.74,617 Cr

Source :The Hindu :NEW DELHI, July 8, 2011

Union Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee on Friday exhorted chief executives of all public sector banks (PSBs) and financial institutions to contain the downward trend in asset quality by devising suitable strategies for curbing and rolling back their non performing assets (NPAs).

Addressing the CEOs of banks and financial institutions at a review meeting here, Mr. Mukherjee lauded the significant credit growth of 22.44 per cent posted by the PSBs during 2010-11 but also pointed to a moderation in the last quarter while sounding a note of caution to all in respect of asset quality.

“Of course, [asset quality] is an area of concern as gross NPAs have increased from March 2010 to March 2011.

 Gross NPAs have increased from Rs.59,927 crore to Rs.74,617 crore,”

 Mr. Mukherjee told the media after the meeting.

 “Growth of NPAs was one item on which detailed discussions have taken place and I have suggested to the public sector bank CMDs that you must not only apply your due diligence for the fresh sanction of loans but also ensure the mechanism through which the NPA growth could be stemmed,” he said.

The core CRAR (capital to risk assets ratio), also known as capital adequacy ratio (CAR), of scheduled commercial banks as on March 31, 2010, stood at 10.1 per cent under the Basel-II framework. This, Mr. Mukherjee said, was much above the Reserve Bank of India's stipulation of 6 per cent and underlined the core capital strength of the Indian banking system. He was also happy to note that the RBI had reported that stress tests of credit risk exposure of banks revealed a reasonably comfortable position and their resilience to withstand unexpected deterioration in credit quality.

To gear up for the future, the Finance Minister advised the PSB chiefs to undertake a comprehensive capital planning exercise, particularly in view of the Basel-III capital adequacy benchmarks which have to be adopted. Also, considering the increasing investment needs of the infrastructure sector, he said banks need to sustain and improve the flow of credit and they should gain more headroom for lending to such projects by availing of ‘Takeout finance' facilities from IIFC.

With regard to MSMEs (micro, small and medium enterprises), Mr. Mukherjee said that although banks have achieved 35 per cent growth in credit to the sector against the target of 20 per cent, there was a decline in the number of micro enterprise accounts and the lending agencies must proactively extend credit to this sector. Likewise, the performance, under the one per cent ‘Interest subvention scheme for housing loans and interest subsidy for housing urban poor' (ISHUP), he said, has not been up to the desired level and banks need to increase credit disbursement in this segment, he said.

As for the farm sector, Mr. Mukherjee said that while the credit flow momentum seen in 2010-11 had to be maintained and the overall progress of agricultural credit was a matter of satisfaction, many banks had failed to meet their obligations. These banks, he said, must focus attention on this important aspect and show visible signs of improvement in their performance.

Mr. Mukherjee also pointed out that there was a wide gap between the number of farm loan accounts and the ‘Kisan Credit Cards' (KCCs) issued, which suggested that there were still a large number of inactive cards. Banks, he said, should put in place a system for renewal of these cards on an on-going basis and ensure disbursement of credit through these cards.

The Finance Minister said the task force under the chairmanship of Nandan Nilekani in its interim report had recommended a general, unified, platform called ‘Core subsidy management system' for direct subsidy and entitlement transfer. The UIDAI, he said, had empanelled 64 banks for opening ‘Aadhaar' enabled bank accounts along with Aadhaar enrolment, which is in consonance with the financial inclusion agenda of the Finance Ministry.

SBI Vs B I Metalic Steel & Alloys Ltd

IN THE DEBT RECOVERY APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT CHENNAI

DATED THE 22^ND APRIL, 2004

PRESENT:  HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE A. SUBBULAKSHMY

CHAIRPERSON

MA-37/2003

(MA-95/02 in RA-1/02 in MP-3&4/01 in RP-375/01 in OA-1144/1995-DRT, Hyderabad)

BETWEEN:

State Bank of India,

Main Branch, Bank Street,

Koti, Hyderabad.

….  Appellant

            (Counsel:  Mr. K.S. Sundar)

AND

1.  Mr. V. Chakrapani,             (Party in person)

     325, Kabra Complex,

     M.G. Road, Secunderabad,.

2.  M/s. Bi Metalic Steel & Alloys Ltd.,

     Rep. by its Official Liquidator,

     Hyderabad.

3.  Allahabad Bank,

     Parklane Branch,

     Secunderabad.

…  Respondents

:  O R D E R  :

1.         The Original Application (OA) was allowed by the Tribunal by Order dated 13.1.1997.  Recovery proceedings commenced.  The 1^st respondent filed MP-3/2001 before the Recovery Officer praying to close the recovery proceedings against immovable properties of the defaulter as barred by limitation and another petition MP-4/2001 was also filed before the Recovery Officer by M/s. V.M. Finance & Leasing Company against the property and the Recovery Officer rejected both the applications by Order dated 28.8.2002.  

Then the petitioner in MP-3/01 preferred an appeal RA-1/2002 before the Presiding Officer and that was dismissed by the Tribunal by Order dated 4.10.2002.  

Again the 1^st respondent filed Review Petition MA-95/2002 before the Tribunal for reviewing its Order dated 4.10.2002 and the Review Petition was allowed by the Tribunal by Order dated 6.1.2003 and consequently RA-1/02 was also allowed.  That Order dated 6.1.2003 is being now challenged by the Bank in this appeal.

2.         The Recovery Officer in his Order dated 28.8.2002 has found that the Demand Notice under Rule-2 of the Second Schedule of Income Tax Act, 1961 were issued under Part-1 of the Rules whereas attachment of the property is provided under Rule 48 of the said rules and service of attachment is provided under Rule 49 and Proclamation of Attachment is provided under Rule 50 and Rule 51 clearly states that the attachment of property under Rule 48 shall relate back to the date on which the notice to pay arrears was served and the time limit of four years stipulated in Rule 68(B) shall be taken into consideration only with reference to the service of the proceedings commenced from the stage of Rule 48 i.e. attachment and not earlier in view of the language used under Rule 68(B) of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 to the effect that no sale of immovable property shall be made under this part after expiry of 4 years and in the present case attachment of immovable property was issued under Rule 48 on 31.7.2001 and still the period of 4 years is available for proceeding further and it is not barred by limitation. 

3.         Even though the PO, DRT, initially dismissed the appeal RA-1/02 preferred as against the Recovery Officer’s Order, on the Review Petition (MA-95/02) filed by the 1^st respondent herein, the PO, DRT allowed that Review Petition by Order dated 6.1.2003 holding that after recovery proceedings are taken he is empowered to act only under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, which is made applicable under Section 29 read with Section 34 of the RDDB&FI Act and he has ultimately found that it is barred by limitation. 

 The PO’s finding is that the Recovery Officer has to take action with regard to the recovery only under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, which is made applicable under Section-29 read with Section-34 of the RDDB&FI Act. 

4.         Section-29 of the RDDB&FI Act, 1993 reads as follows :-

“Application of certain provisions of Income-tax Act:  The provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, as in force from time to time shall, as far as possible, apply with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the amount of debt due under this Act instead of to the income-tax :

Provided that any reference under the said provisions and the rules to the “assessee” shall be construed as a reference to the defendant under this Act.”

5.         Section-34 of the RDDB&FI Act, 1993 reads as follows -

“Act to have overriding effect – (1) Save as provided under sub-section (2), the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.

(2)        The provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948, the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963, the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India Act, 1984 [the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and the Small Industries Development Bank of India Act, 1989]”

6.         Section-29 of the RDDB&FI Act clearly states that only the provisions of the Second and Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962 as in force from time to time shall as far as possible apply with necessary modification.  It clearly states that the provisions of Second and Third Schedules to the Income tax Act, 1961 alone will apply and not the entire Income Tax Act.  

So, the finding of the PO, DRT that after execution proceedings started the provisions of the Income Tax Act is made applicable under Section 29 read with Section 34 of the RDDB&FI Act, is erroneous and it is liable to be set aside in as much as Section 29 reads that the provisions of Second and Third Schedules to the Income Tax Act and Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962 alone will apply as far as possible. 

7.         Rule-68B of the Second Schedule of Income Tax Act, 1961 reads as follows :-

“Time limit for sale of attached immovable property -  (1) No sale of immovable property shall be made under this Part after the expiry of four years from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum, for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has become conclusive under the provisions of section 245-I or, as the case may be, final in terms of the provisions of Chapter XX.”

8.         Rule-68B of the Income tax Act states that amount for recovery of which immovable property has been attached, that has become conclusive under the provisions of Section 245-I or, as the case may be, final in terms of the provisions of Chapter XX.  

This Rule is not applicable under the RDDB&FI Act and these provisions cannot be applied to for sale of the property under the RDDB&FI Act. Rule-68B will apply only for the recovery of amount which has become conclusive under the provisions of Section 245-I or in terms of provisions of Chapter XX.  Since the provisions of Section 245-I and Chapter XX are not applicable under the RDDB&FI Act, this cannot be invoked at all.

9.         The 1^st Respondent pointed out that by applying this provision under Rule-68B, the period of four years has to be reckoned from the end of the financial year in which the Order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum of recovery to which the immovable property has been attached.  The 1^st respondent pointed out that the OA Order was passed on 13.1.1997 and from the end of the financial year if the period of four years is reckoned this case is clearly barred by limitation.  He pointed out that the Order giving rise to a demand means Order passed in the main OA and from that date from the end of that financial year, no sale can take place after the expiry of four years.  That argument is not an acceptable one.  The provisions of Section 245-I or provisions of Chapter XX are not applicable under the RDDB&FI Act.  The end of financial year will come only in the case of Income tax arrears and interest etc. and not under the RDDB&FI Act.  The question of financial year will not arise under the Act under the provisions and Section 245-I or Chapter XX are also not applicable under the RDDB&FI Act.  Section-29 of the RDDB&FI Act clearly states that only the provisions of Second and Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 will apply with necessary modification.  The Heading in Section-29 itself indicates that only certain provisions of the Income tax Act shall be applicable i.e. provisions of Second and Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act.  So the whole of Income tax Act is not applicable under the RDDB&FI Act and also the provisions of Section 245-I or Chapter XX.  The amount which has become conclusive under the provisions of Section 245-I or Chapter XX alone cannot be recovered after the expiry of four years from the end of the financial year and not the amount determined under the RDDB&FI Act.  So, by invoking Section-68B of the Income-tax Act the 1^st respondent cannot contend that the time limit fixed for sale of attached immovable property under the RDDB&FI Act is only four years from the end of the financial year in which the Order for demand arises.  So the period of limitation set out in Rule-68B is not applicable for recovery of the amount under the RDDB&FI Act.

10.       Further, Section-24 of the RDDB&FI Act states with regard to the limitation.  It reads that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be, apply to an application made to a Tribunal.  With regard to the limitation, it has been clearly set out under the Act that only the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to an application made under the RDDB&FI Act to the Tribunal.  When there is specific provision with regard to the limitation under the RDDB&FI Act, the provisions contained in Section-68B of the Income-tax Act cannot be applied.  Under the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for execution proceedings is 12 years.

11.       Law empowers the Recovery Officer a period of 12 years to start the execution proceedings.  When there is specific provision which is made applicable for recovery of the amount under the RDDB&FI Act, only that law is applicable and not the period of limitation provided under Rule-68B of the Income tax Act.  

All the cases which have been transferred to the DRT under the RDDB&FI Act were pending before the Civil Court before the enactment of the RDDB&FI Act. 

 After the RDDB&FI Act came into force, under the provisions of this Act the cases pending before the Civil Court were transferred and only those provisions relating to recovery of proceedings for mortgage suits are applicable under the RDDB&FI Act as there is specific provision under the Act with regard to the period of limitation under Section-24 of the Act. 

 So, the period of limitation is only 12 years and not the period mentioned in Rule-68B of the Income Tax Act.  

So, I do not find any force in the argument advanced by the 1st respondent.  Order dated 6.1.2003 passed by the PO, DRT, Hyderabad, allowing the Review Petition (MA-95/02) and consequently allowing RA-1/2002 holding that the recovery proceedings against immovable properties is barred by limitation, is erroneous and it is liable to be set aside and it is set aside.

12.       Appeal allowed.  Order dated 6.1.2003 passed by the PO, DRT, Hyderabad, in the Review Petition (MA-95/2002) is set aside.  Recovery Officer is directed to continue the recovery proceedings.

(Dictated to PS & the transcript corrected, pronounced & signed by me in the open court today the 22^nd April, 2004).

[ MRS. JUSTICE A. SUBBULAKSHMY ]

CHAIRPERSON

Karnataka banks file cases to recover Rs 120.25 cr

Source :BL :BANGALORE, JUNE 19:2011

Banks, belonging to both the public and private sector in Karnataka, have filed 25,473 revenue recovery cases, amounting to Rs 120.25 crore under the Revenue Recovery (RR) Act.

According to a note prepared for the 117{+t}{+h} State Level Bankers' Committee (SLBC)-Karnataka meet to be discussed on Monday, there are 8,588 cases pending for more than three years for recovery under the RR Act, Karnataka Agricultural Operations and Miscellaneous Provisions (KACOMP) Act and Karnataka Public Moneys Recovery of Dues (KPMR) Act.

In the current quarter, banks filed 783 applications involving a loan amount of Rs 5.04 crore.

At the 115th SLBC meet, it was reported that deputy commissioners of Chickmagalur and Kodagu districts were not accepting cases under the RR Act .

The State Revenue Department was requested to advise district-level authorities to expedite execution of recovery certificates for realising the dues.

“The State Revenue Department has been asked to inform the SLBC meet on Monday on steps taken in this regard,” said the SLBC convenor.

DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNAL

Positions of presiding officer and recovery officer at Bangalore Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) have not been filled and are lying vacant for long. This has hampered the cases pending before the tribunal.

The presiding officer of Chennai DRT holds additional charge of Bangalore DRT.

As a result, it is reported that numerous instances of delay in taking the recovery measures to logical end even after issuance of a decree/order/RC.

“The delay in appointment is leading to deterioration in asset quality and value of assets charged to the banks. Since this is of prime concern to all banks, the State Bank of India has requested for taking up DRT matters in SLBC meetings for solving the issues,” explained the convenor.

RECOVERY TAHSILDARS

The Under Secretary to the Government Finance Department, in a letter on July 13, 2010, informed as follows, “Earlier the districts with large amount of bank dues to be recovered as arrears of land revenue used to have Recovery Tahsildars assisted by few staff. The salary of the recovery unit was being met by the banks. It is advised to place this matter before the SLBC to take a view whether the same arrangement can be revived.”

The matter was discussed during earlier SLBC meetings and based on the suggestion of the sub-committee on recovery and rehabilitation, it was decided in the previous SLBC meeting to select Belgaum, Bellary, Uttara Kannada and Bijapur districts for appointment of special tahasildars for recovery as these districts have have a higher number of cases pending under the RR Act.

expected to inform the steps taken in this regard.

SLBC has requested the State Finance Department for the appointment of special Tahasildars in the above districts and the Finance Department is

expected to inform the steps taken in this regard.