Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Amount required to be deposited under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act be reduced to 25% of the claimed amount.





M/s.Kakumanu consultants (P) ltd & ors V/S A.O., Union Bank of India & 5 ors 
A.IR:820/2011


Ld. Counsel Shri G.R. Lakshmanan appearing on behalf of the petitioner stated that the petitioner has filed this appeal against the order dated 29.09.2011 passed by the Ld. Presiding Officer, DRT-III Chennai and stated that the appellants have ample chances of success in the appeal.  The Ld. Counsel stated that the petitioners are presently undergoing a severe financial crisis and that the petitioners are trying to sell their personal properties which are not mortgaged to the bank and that by the said sale they would be able to wipe out their entire liability and prayed that the pre-deposit required to be deposited under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act be reduced to 25% of the claimed amount.

Ld. Counsel for the first respondent bank stated that the petitioners have not shown their bonafide and that they may be directed to deposit the entire dues to the bank as they are only delaying the recovery process by filing this appeal.  It is stated by the Ld. Counsel that as on March 2011 the dues are Rs.16,83,89,884.72.  The Ld. Counsel for the first respondent bank stated that the petition has no merits and prayed that the same may be dismissed.

Heard the Ld. Counsel.

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly in view of the fact that the dues as on March 2011 is Rs.16,83,89,884.72 and in view of the fact that the petitioners are trying to dispose of   a   property which has   not been mortgaged to the bank to enable them to come out of the  financial crisis that they are presently facing and thus settle the entire dues of the bank and further in view of the fact that petitioners cannot be denied the opportunity to put forth their case in this appeal filed by them and also from the fact that as on 1.7.2011 a sum of Rs.17,94,98,119.72 is due to the bank it would be appropriate if the petitioners are directed to deposit a sum equivalent to 25% of Rs.17,94,98,119.72.  Accordingly the following order is passed:

“The petitioners are directed to deposit Rs.4,48,74,530/- being 25% of Rs.17,94,98,119/-  into this Tribunal on or before 5.12.2011.  In the event the petitioners deposit the said sum of Rs.4,48,74,530/- into this Tribunal on or before 5.12.2011 the Authorized officer shall stand restrained from in any way proceeding any further under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act in any manner till 5.12.2011 and the Registry is directed to post this IA on 6.12.2011.  In the event the said deposit of Rs.4,48,74,530/-  is not made into this Tribunal on or before 5.12.2011 this petition shall stand automatically dismissed. “


10th oct 2011 chennai

ASSOCHAM opposes new classification norms for NBFC NPAs




Source :Assocham :Oct 8,2011



New Delhi: Industry body ASSOCHAM has opposed the government’s classification of non-performing assets (NPAs) belonging to non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) which provides for secured and unsecured advances if the overdue period exceeds 90 days.
Under the existing norms, an unsecured asset overdue beyond 90 days and a secured asset overdue beyond 180 days are treated as NPAs.


“NBFCs are a major source of funding for unorganised sector of the economy. The revised classification will eventually increase capital requirements of NBFCs and their cost of lending,” said The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) in response to draft recommendations of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Working Group.


It also suggested an enhanced time frame of five years due to difficult and uncertain economic conditions for tier one capital for capital to risk weighted assets ratio (CRAR) at 12 per cent – instead of within three years as proposed by the group.


NBFCs should be allowed to deploy surplus liquidity in government securities, treasury bills and money market with maturity beyond 30 days. For computing total financial assets, cash and bank deposits, such instruments may be deducted and treated as part of financial assets, said ASSOCHAM secretary general D.S. Rawat.
On regulating loans to stock brokers and merchant bankers, it suggested that status quo may be maintained as the present restriction of capital market exposure of 10 per cent of net worth by banks will restrict the ability of NBFCs to lend to this sector.


To increase CRAR from 100 to 150 per cent for capital market exposure and 125 per cent on real estate exposure, the chamber said this will increase the cost of borrowing for NBFCs and also be a deterrent for banks to lend to NBFCs.


Borrowing through external commercial borrowings (ECB) route or NBFC is currently prohibited. It should be allowed so that NBFCs have a window to raise funds at substantially low rate of interests.


Any further tightening may create systemic risk for the sector. Mr Rawat said no asset size ceiling should be insisted if the NBFCs are not accessing public funds for registration with the RBI.
Inter-corporate deposits may be excluded from the definition of public funds where the lending company has not received any public funds and both the lending as well as borrowing company belong to the same group.


As the term business has not been defined, companies which are holding long-term investments in shares of group companies (and thus are merely investment companies) may not be considered as carrying on the business of NBFCs.


To tackle the problem of bad assets and asset recovery, the RBI Working Group has proposed that NBFCs should be brought under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interests (SARFAESI) Act. The chamber said it is a bold step and NBFCs should be able to access the service of Debt Recovery Tribunals as well.
Existing non-deposit taking NBFCs having a net worth above Rs 500 crore and desirous of converting to NBFCs-D should be allowed to do so automatically with intimation to the RBI.
Also, assessing officers may be directed to issue nil tax deducted at source (TDS) certificates wherever the customer base exceeds 1,000 subject to the condition that the assessed pays an advance amount equal to the average of its tax paid in last three years.


NBFCs account for nearly 12 per cent of advances of the total financial system and can play a major role in furthering financial inclusion. There are 12,630 NBFCs registered with the RBI providing credit delivery in asset financing and hire purchase. In 2010-11 they delivered credit to the tune of Rs 4.62 lakh crore. 


SEC 18 of SARFAESI ACT





V.R.S.Prasad & anr V/S A.O., City Union Bank & anr 
A.IR:697/2011


IA 1023/11 (waiver);  Ld.  Counsel Shri K.C. Krishnamurthy appearing on behalf of the petitioners stated that the order of the Ld.  Presiding Officer is liable to be set aside and that this Tribunal may impose a condition of deposit of 25% of the dues of the bank to meet out the requirement under Sec.18 of the SARFAESI Act.

Ld.  Counsel Shri Balachander appearing on behalf of the respondent bank stated that the dues of the petitioners to the bank is Rs.57,62,565/- and that this Tribunal may direct the petitioners to deposit 50% of the said dues as mandated in the Sec.18 of the SARFAESI Act.

Heard the Ld.  Counsel.

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case the following order is passed.

“The petitioners are directed to deposit a sum of Rs.28,81,283/-  being 50% of Rs.57,62,565/- into this Tribunal on or before 18.10.2011.


  In the event the petitioners deposit the said amount of Rs.28,81,283/- into this Tribunal on or before 18.10.2011 the Authorized Officer shall stand restrained from in any way proceeding any further under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act in any manner till 19.10.2011.


 The Registry is directed to post this IA on 19.10.2011. 


 In the event the said deposit of Rs.28,81,283/- is not made into this Tribunal  on or before 18.10.2011 the Authorized officer shall be at liberty to proceed further under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and this IA shall stand automatically dismissed”


The above order was passed on 11 th oct 2011


Borrower should be given an oppertunity to Cross examin a bank officer





M.A:582/2010
Krishna & co., & ors V/S SB Mysore -


Ld.  Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants stated that the appellants should be given an opportunity to cross examine an officer of the respondent bank who would be able to speak on the basis of the records to enable the appellants to demonstrate before the Tribunal below that the appellants are not liable for the debt and that the so called debt is not at all a debt in this case.

Ld.  Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent bank stated that the person who was the officer at the relevant point of time has expired and that the bank may be permitted to produce any officer of the bank to speak on the basis of the records.

Heard the Ld.  Counsel. 

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case the following order is passed.

“The respondent bank is permitted to produce an officer of the bank to speak on the basis of records on 12.10.2011 and the appellants are permitted to cross examine the said officer on the same day subject to the convenience of the Ld.  Presiding officer, DRT-I, Chennai. Ld.  Counsel for the appellants and the respondent bank are requested to take a print out of this order from the ‘A’ dairy which is posted in the internet and produce the same with a memo before the Ld.  Presiding officer to enable him to order for the cross examination of the bank officer”

This MA is disposed of accordingly.


The above order was issued on 11 th oct 2011 by DRAT ,Chennai

Monday, October 10, 2011

Reconstructing asset reconstruction firms


Asset reconstruction companies can buy the bad assets from banks by paying cash or offering security receipts that get redeemed a few years later



Source :live Mint:Sun, Oct 9 2011. 11:11 PM IST



In the first quarter of fiscal 2012 ended June, the non-performing assets, or NPAs, of 11 banks with maximum stressed loans rose by Rs15,425 crore. Since fiscal 2010, these banks have added almost Rs83,000 crore worth of bad assets. 


With interest rates rising and the economy slowing, more and more corporations will default on bank loans. But not too many banks are selling their bad assets to asset reconstruction companies, or ARCs.


 Why?


 Many of them are restructuring stressed assets by giving borrowers more time to repay, while a few are disbursing fresh funds to the stressed accounts to pay up the bad loans.




ARCs can buy the bad assets from banks by paying cash or offering security receipts (SRs) that get redeemed a few years later. Typically, banks look for higher valuations while accepting SRs against bad assets, and discounts are steeper for cash deals. 


Overall, banks are not too willing to sell bad assets to ARCs and there are many reasons behind that. When a bank parts with an asset to an ARC, it has to set aside money or make full provision between the book value of the loan and the value at which it is sold to an ARC. This impacts the bank’s profitability.


 Typically, banks make full provision for a bad asset over three to four years. This means they can postpone the impact on their profits by carrying the bad assets on their books for a few years and sell them to ARCs as a last resort of recovery when no more fresh provisions are required.

Illustration by Jayachandran/Mint
Illustration by Jayachandran/Mint













































































Besides, banks enjoy the same powers that an ARC enjoys even though, operationally, they may lack the expertise to recover bad loans. So most banks attempt to recover a bad loan or rehabilitate the stressed borrower on their own and when they fail to do so, sell the bad assets to ARCs.



Finally, there is always a gap between the value that banks expect from bad assets and the price ARCs are willing to offer. The driving factor here is the cost of funds. While banks discount the future expected realizations from recovery at about 10% a year, ARCs insist on at least 20% discount. This means over three years, while bank wants to recover Rs70 from an asset worth Rs100, ARCs quote a price of around Rs40. 


Besides, banks need to pay them a management fee that varies between 1% and 2% of the size of the asset in case of sale through SRs. Most banks find such a hefty discount unacceptable; they also do not realize that the longer they delay the transfer of assets to ARCs, the faster is the fall in the final realizable value.


Banks auction bad assets to ARCs, but do not offer any floor price for such auctions. Often, after receiving price quotes from ARCs, they withdraw the assets from auction and start negotiating with the borrower for a settlement, using the highest bid as a floor. The auction of bad loans for many banks is not a part of the process of selling such loans, but a price discovery method to bargain hard with the defaulter for recovery.


While banks are allowed to take profit from the sale of bad assets (if the sale price consideration is higher than book value), in case of a settlement with the defaulter borrower, such profit from the sale of assets to ARCs cannot be booked even if it is paid in cash. They money thus generated needs to be kept as a cushion against future provisions. This is also a disincentive for banks to sell NPAs to ARCs.


Regulatory aspects
Let’s look at the regulatory aspects of the industry. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued the final guidelines for ARCs in April 2003 after the Parliament passed the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, and subsequently several changes were made. The norms allow the acquisition of financial assets both on the books of ARCs as well as under a trust structure outlined in the Act. 


There are 14 ARCs in India and about 98% of the assets that they have acquired are through the trust structure. 


This means ARCs do not own the assets but they manage the assets of the trust. In that sense, they cannot have NPAs on their books; but RBI norms insist that when they are not able to recover the bad assets in accordance with the plan envisaged, they need to classify them as NPAs and this means they cannot earn their management fee on such assets.




Incidentally, SRs are subject to declaration of net asset value (NAV) every six months, based on ratings by ratings agencies; and SR investors (including ARCs for their own investments) are required to book losses in case of a drop in NAV.
The capital requirement for ARCs is also an issue on which the industry is divided. Going by RBI norms, an ARC needs to follow 15% capital adequacy till it has Rs100 crore capital. This means that for every Rs100 worth of bad loan bought, they need to have Rs15 capital. This norm is relaxed once an ARC has Rs100 crore capital, but all ARCs must pick up at least a 5% stake in the SRs that they sell against the bad assets.


Many say that ARCs should have more capital and invest more in SRs as they will be more aggressive and diligent in recovery when they have more skin in the game. Often when they buy bad assets and offer SRs, the valuation is too high and ARCs strike deals knowing fully well the SRs will not fetch such a high price at redemption and seller banks will lose. They will not do so if they hold a larger part of the SRs.


 But there is a strong opposite view too: since ARCs are managing the trusts, why do they need to have hefty capital? Also, why do they need to invest in SRs? After all, they are playing the role of asset management companies (managing bad assets); and the mutual funds that follow the same principle do not require a big capital base and they do not need to make own investments.


ARCs are being created to clean up the banking system and prevent capital infusion in banks (as banks need to set aside money for bad assets, they need more capital when bad assets grow), and if ARCs themselves need hefty capital, the purpose of their creation is not well served.


Instead, RBI needs to broaden the investor base in SRs. Currently, qualified institutional buyers, or QIBs, such as banks and insurance firms, are allowed to subscribe to SRs which are rated instruments. Foreign investment in such instruments is capped at 49% and no individual foreign institutional investor, or FII, can hold more than 10%. Perhaps, the regulator feels that a larger role for foreign investors will encourage them to take over sick Indian firms through the back door. But such apprehensions have no basis as most defaulters are in bad shape and they cannot attract serious investors.


 Foreign investors should be allowed to play a larger role in investing in SRs floated by the trust and encouraged to get actively involved in the recovery process, the way a private equity fund handholds the promoters of a firm in which it invests. Foreign distressed-debt investors are specialized institutions who like to have a significant stake in a trust or scheme with some control.


Recovery models


Typically, ARCs follow three models of recovery. The first is the asset stripping or the vulture model. In this case, they shut the unit’s functioning and strip the assets to recover money.
The second model is the arbitrage model.


 In this case, ARCs add very little value; they acquire an asset from a bank at a price and go back to the same borrower and settle at a higher price, creating a spread by virtue of their superior negotiating skills with the borrower.


This also explains why banks use ARCs as a price discovery platform and then go back to settle with the borrower themselves using the ARC-quoted price as a floor.
The last model is the revival model that involves the restructuring of financials, processes and the infusion of long-term funds. The mere acquisition of an asset doesn’t revive an account. Apart from arranging funds, ARCs should also be allowed to take equity exposure in a sick company by converting a part of the debt for speedy recovery.


 While dealing with a listed entity, any such exposure will attract the so-called takeover code of the market regulator that makes an open offer mandatory for any acquisition of a 25% stake or more in a company; for unlisted entities, it can be a contract between the company and ARC.




The Securitisation Act allowed ARCs to change or take over the management and sale, or lease, of the business of the defaulting borrowers; but RBI took seven years to actually empower them, that too in a truncated manner. They can take over the management, but cannot lease the business as yet.


There have been very few cases where the business has been taken over, but the powers to do so act as a threat and make the recovery process relatively easier.
The rogue borrowers always want to oppose any recovery move; there have been thousands of cases in which they have dragged ARCs to court to delay the process.


Technically, the borrowers are required to offer one-fourth of the dues to legally challenge any recovery move, but this norm is not always followed. Besides, ARCs are allowed to acquire only secured NPAs from the Indian banking system, leaving the other debt-holders to proceed under civil court procedure.


There are many other issues that RBI should look into to make the asset reconstruction industry work well, such as allowing the transfer of assets among ARCs and permitting them to offer working capital support to industrial units under revival; but no model will work unless the banks themselves appreciate the importance of selling bad assets and stay away from financial incest.
The concept of securitization has not taken off as banks that sell their bad assets to ARCs often insist that these cannot be mixed to create a pool.


This means ARCs need to hold bad assets of individual banks as separate pools under a trust, and the banks are subscribing to SRs of their own assets. In other words, the banks are simply removing the bad assets from their loan books and bringing them back as good assets through their investment books (that hold SRs). Arcil, I am told, has set up at least 350 trusts, and many of them are seller-specific trusts. This practice might prove to be the proverbial last nail in the coffin of India’s asset reconstruction industry if it dies a premature death.


There is a clear conflict of interest as the banks are holding the dual role of owners as well as beneficiaries—sellers as well as investors in SRs. They are also the major shareholders in some ARCs. One way of reconstructing ARCs could be by capping sponsor banks’ exposures at 10% and keeping the nominees of the sponsors out of the acquisition and resolutions committees of the firms.


The representation of banks as a class of shareholder in the board of ARCs should also be capped. This is not a unique idea as in credit information bureaux, too, no bank is allowed to hold more than a 10% stake. This, along with an expansion in the investor base in SRs will help ARCs securitise bad loans in the true sense of the term. Let the banks focus on their main business of lending, and ARCs on recovery.


And till such time the industry fully understands the nuances of bad asset buys and recovery, no new ARC should be allowed to set shop.


Tamal Bandyopadhyay keeps a close eye on all things banking from his perch asMint’s deputy managing editor in Mumbai

US-Euro crisis has unleashed a currency war, India faces heat


Source :Nagaland post:10 Oct. 2011 2:11 AM IST

The US-Euro crisis is shaking Asian and Indian economy. The latest shock of State Bank of India downgrading by Moody indicates a grim scenario. It has not only shaken confidence in the banking system but also in the stock market. 

It is not an isolated incident. Banks in India have been facing crisis for some time with their non-performing assets (NPA) - losses- rising, fall in credit offtake and repayments affected.
But the US-Euro crisis has greater impact on currencies. Rupee, Korean Wan, Brazil’s Rial, Russian Rouble, Polish Zolti and South Africa Rand are losing their strength against dollar. This is what Fed Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s “operation twist” is doing to world economy.
Brazilian finance minister G Matenga says a “currency war” is being waged. He says there is an overflow of dollars to wreck the strength of other currencies. 


India has started feeling it. Rupee has slid to around Rs 50 to a dollar. It could have slid further had not RBI intervened. Till July 27 one dollar used to cost Rs 43.85.
Since then not only rupee but all other currencies are facing severe pressure. Countries like Korea, Turkey, Thailand, South Africa, Brazil and India are perturbed at the sudden rise in demand for dollar. The observers in these countries had a feeling that the US dollar would not be able to regain strength. But the US Fed Reserve policy has changed all that. 


Bankers are finding the situation untenable and on October 4 met at Mumbai. They called upon RBI to ease the interest rate regime. Chief executive of Indian Banks Association K Ramakrishnan says bankers want a pause to rate hikes 


The credit growth during this period was of 20.1 per cent or by Rs 31,490 crore. But it is not reassuring. It was mostly due to disbursals of outstanding credit order by the petroleum, coal and nuclear sectors. 


The emerging economies are unable to match the US operation twist. Even a year back the emerging economies were supposed to be the global engine. They had growth, flow of money towards share market and other investments. They were seeing investments at the cost of withdrawals in due to weakening US dollar and Euro. 


The currencies in the emerging economies were strengthening, sometimes causing worries in these countries. The added advantage was the large flow of investments as interest rates were rising in many of these countries. 


The US googly has upset all that. The US Fed unlike many other economies has not increased interest rates. It has also not called a stop to spending and its policy of strengthening the bond market has given a severe shock to the emerging countries like India. The Global Emerging Market index has lost 18 per cent in September, the highest since the 2008 Lehman Brothers crisis. 


The US Citi Bank believes that 40 per cent of it is contributed by the falling currencies in these countries. There is large selling in the share market in these economies. Since the Fed Reserve operation twist foreign investors retracted investment worth $ 220,000 in India alone. 


The bond market is equally seeing the crisis. Investments in bonds of companies were coming largely from European banks. Now they are withdrawing their investments. Even the Chinese and East European corporate bond bazaars are in a tizzy. 


Till this new crisis, India, Brazil, Russia and Korea were supposed to have three security rings. It was believed that US-Euro crisis were more a touch and go affair for them. The first was growth, which was the greatest strength of these countries. The second was an attractive share market. The investors used to invest in these countries with loans available on low interest. This was providing stability in the currency market. This was the third security ring. 


Now all the three rings are dissipating. The growth is gradually coming down. It may go down to 6.5 per cent this year, much less than the revised 7.8 per cent target. Fitch Ratings had revised downward growth projection of Indian economy to 7.5 per cent. Next year these economies may further slow down to 6.1 per cent. Slowdown is a reality. 


Investors are on a flight from these share markets adding to weakening of currencies like rupee. Countries like India are facing severe inflation. This means a further fall in currency value. The weakening rupee further fuels inflation. 


This does not stop here. A weak rupee makes petroleum, mineral and other imports expensive. A larger dollar flow is upsetting many economic calculations. 


A weak currency should raise hopes for higher exports. This is difficult as global demand is slackening. 


It may lead to another difficult scenario. As investors withdraw their investments in dollar and export market remains weak it might lead to another difficulty. The forex reserves may come down and add to other problems. 


In a scenario like this Moody’s downgrading of SBI indicates another danger. Its deterioration of NPAs is due to very high exposure to infrastructure companies. These borrowers are facing severe problems in the form of high infrastructure exposure, high interest rates and implementation delays in the wake of the slowing economy leaving more scope for rise in NPAs. Bounce back by SBI does not seem to be easy particularly when a further fall may not be unlikely. 


The SBI has led the fall of other banking stocks - ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank, Axis Bank and Yes Bank at stock market. Is the malaise spreading? 


SBI is awaiting government funding for bailing it out of crisis. This may be welcome for SBI but it affects government finances and reserves and may lead to larger borrowings. That is a criticality. It is certain to increase fiscal deficit, something that may cause further anxiety as not money is left with banks for credit purposes squeezed by high interest rates and NPAs. Would that further cause another slowdown? 


Not absolutely unlikely unless RBI comes with a policy to match the googly of US Fed Reserve. It is a difficult proposition. 



The US Fed Reserve has still the backing of a strong political system despite many crises being faced by the US economy. The RBI decision to throw a googly would have political repercussion. It needs the consent of the government. In a critical geo-political situation it would not be easy. 

Debt restructuring plans flood banks



Source :BS:Abhijit Lele / Mumbai October 10, 2011, 1:08 IST


The financial sector is beginning to bear the brunt of deteriorating quality of corporate debt. The corporate debt restructuring (CDR) mechanism set up to help companies unable to repay liabilities has gone up over six times in the first six months of FY 12.
Bankers expect things to worsen in the next two quarters. A State Bank of India executive said, “The slowdown in growth and pressure from rising interest costs may substantially increase the number of cases referred to the CDR forum in the third and fourth quarters of FY12.”

In fact, concerns over asset quality topped the agenda for pre-policy review discussions bankers had with the Reserve Bank of India last week. Bankers requested they be allowed to recast CDR accounts for a second time for companies or units whose debt was reworked after the financial crisis in 2008.

According to the CDR Forum, a platform set up by banks and financial institutions, cases worth Rs 34,562 crore went for debt restructuring in the first half of the financial year compared to just Rs 5,179 crore in the year-ago period. The number of companies referred has risen from 21 to 35.

GTL, a network services firm, and its telecom tower business associate entities accounted for almost 70 per cent of the amount at Rs 22,621 crore. Even after excluding GTL, the debt restructuring amount more than doubled to Rs 11,941 crore. That mostly involved medium-size units from the steel, textiles, pharmaceutical, infrastructure and edible oil segments. Some of the other companies in the list are K S Oil (Rs 2,564 crore), Maneesh Pharma (Rs 1,179) and Ruchi Power & Steel Industries (Rs 600 crore).

In December 2008, the RBI had allowed banks to again restructure debt of viable units with lowering status of account, as a one-time measure.

Bankers said there were a number of reasons for more companies being referred to CDR. For one, many have been unable to bear the burden of rising interest costs. These units are already under pressure of high input costs and lack of overseas demand.

Referring a company to CDR eases the restructuring process. A senior executive with the Bank of Baroda said, “The bank or financial institution is able to control slippages by taking early action. But, this restructuring comes at the cost of higher provisioning.”

According to RBI norms, banks have to make a provision at two per cent for the restructured account, which is treated as standard asset. For a normal standard loan, provisioning is made at 0.4 per cent, which puts pressure on the bottom line.

The references in April-September 2010 had declined due to a better business environment. Some companies, which would have landed at CDR, were able to repay on time.

Rating agency Crisil in its September report said banks’ gross non-performing assets (NPAs) ratio was expected to increase to nearly three per cent by March 31, 2012 from 2.3 per cent a year ago.

The significant increase in interest rates over the past 18 months will adversely impact the asset quality and profitability of India’s banks.