Wednesday, October 26, 2011

M.S.Gnanasoundari vs Indian Bank


M.S.Gnanasoundari vs Indian Bank on 21 February, 2008



DATED: 21.02.2008
C O R A M
THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE P.JYOTHIMANI
W.P.No.35859 of 2007 and M.P.No.1 of 2007
M.S.Gnanasoundari ... Petitioner
vs.
1. Indian Bank,
No.31, Rajaji Salai,
Chennai - 1,
through its Asset Recovery
Management Branch - 1,
No.55, Ethiraj Salai,
Chennai - 8.
2. The Debts Recovery Tribunal - II,
through its Registrar,
4th Floor, Spencers Towers Annexe,
Chennai - 2. ... Respondents
Petition under Article 226 of The Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus, directing the respondents to give effect to the Award dt.07.02.04 by condoning the delay in payment of the Award amount and consequently direct them to record full satisfaction with consequential reliefs.
For Petitioner : Mr.Benjamin
for B.Thilak Narayanan
For Respondent 1: Mr.Jayesh B.Dolia
- - - - -
O R D E R
This writ petition is for direction against the respondents to give effect to the award dated 7.2.2004 by condoning the delay in payment of award amount and consequently, direct the Debts Recovery Tribunal to record the full satisfaction.


2. One M/s.Adams Barter World owned by its proprietor late M.J.Durairaj, availed a term loan of Rs.72,00,000/- and cash credit of Rs.25,00,000/- from the first respondent bank on 30.4.1991. The said Durairaj, husband of the petitioner herein died on 16.10.1993 and according to the petitioner, after the death of her husband, the bank has obtained her signature in various papers. Five years after the death of her husband, the first respondent filed O.A.No.85 of 1998 on the file of Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chennai for recovery of a sum of Rs.3,59,86,583.07. 


According to the petitioner, even now the first respondent bank has failed to furnish the statement of accounts since the said account is classified as NPA. On formation of the second respondent, the case was transferred and the same was renumbered as O.A.No.474 of 2001. During the pendency of the said case, the matter was referred to the Lok Adalat for conciliation and the petitioner has agreed to pay Rs.150 lakhs in full and final settlement of the entire claim amount out of which the petitioner agreed to pay a sum of Rs.38.5 lakhs on or before 31.3.2004 and the balance amount of Rs.111.5 lakhs in September, 2004 with interest at the rate of 11.5% per annum on running balance amount from 7.2.2004. Since the claim is not enforceable against other defendants, the first respondent did not insist for the consent of other defendants in the Lok Adalat. Hence, an award was passed by consent against the petitioner and it was recorded by the second respondent on 7.2.2004 itself and final order was passed in terms of the said award. 2(a). The petitioner has paid the amount of Rs.38.5 lakhs within the time and she has paid the said amount through instalments, the last instalment being paid on 27.3.2004. However, the balance amount which had to be paid on or before the end of September, 2004 could not be paid due to various financial difficulties since the petitioner being the widow has to look after her minor children and her health condition has also become bad and she is living with her daughter in the United States of America. Therefore, the present writ petition is filed through her son being the Power Agent.


2(b). It is also stated that subsequently, on 15.6.2006, the petitioner has paid the balance amount of Rs.111.5 lakhs and the entire amount of Rs.150 lakhs as agreed by the petitioner before the Lok Adalat has been paid however not before the agreed date, viz., September, 2004, but on 15.2.2006. The first respondent contending that since the petitioner has not paid the amount in time, filed I.A.No.37 of 2005 for passing an order determining the liability at Rs.111.50 lakhs with interest at the rate of 11.5% per annum. However, subsequently, the first respondent filed a memo to correct the claim amount as Rs.13,55,99,185.05 with further interest at 20.40% and costs.


2(c). The second respondent has not only allowed the first respondent to file such a memorandum rejecting the claim in respect of other defendants, but also passed a final order as prayed for on the said memorandum however as against the petitioner alone. It is also stated that while the claim made in O.A. itself is Rs.3,59,86,583.07, the amount of Rs.13,55,99,185.05 has been directed to be paid in spite of the fact that the petitioner has paid Rs.150 lakhs as agreed and awarded in the Lok Adalat. The first respondent has filed an appeal in Appeal No.9 of 2007 on the file of Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal challenging the order of the second respondent dated 12.9.2005 in respect of the portion rejecting the claim against other defendants and the said appeal was dismissed on merits on 11.4.2007. The petitioner has also filed a review against the said order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal dated 12.9.2005 passed in I.A.No.37 of 2005 and that was also dismissed by the second respondent. Since the petitioner has paid the entire amount payable as per the award dated 7.02.2004, the order dated 12.9.2005 passed in I.A.No.37 of 2005 has become infructuous. There was some delay in the payment of award amount and the petitioner has come forward to pay interest for the delayed payment and also paid another sum of Rs.24 lakhs on 2.7.2006 and 5.7.2006 towards interest on the said Rs.111.50 lakhs for delayed payment. The amount was remitted in furtherance to the discussion with the Senior Manager of the first respondent. After remittance of the said sum, the first respondent has gone back from its commitment and insisted the petitioner to give a revised offer for settlement.


2(d). The petitioner and other defendants in O.A.No.474 of 2001 received notice on 24.8.2007 under section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,2002 (in short, "SARFESI Act"). The said notice states that the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal is still pending. In fact, the claim against other defendants in the Debts Recovery Tribunal was rejected which has also been confirmed in appeal. O.A.No.474 of 2001 has been disposed of in terms of the award. In these circumstances, the present writ petition is filed for direction as stated above on the basis that the delay in payment of the balance amount of Rs.111.5 lakhs on 15.2.2006 instead of 30.9.2004 is due to various reasons beyond the control of the petitioner.


3. The first respondent has filed the counter affidavit. According to the first respondent, the writ petition is not maintainable since it is filed against the notice issued under section 13(2) of the SARFASI Act. According to the first respondent, OTS (One Time Settlement) proposal got lapsed when the petitioner failed to pay the amount as per the schedule agreed in the Lok Adalat. Whatever payment made by the petitioner would be adjusted against the loan amount of Rs.12.36 crores as on 30.6.2007. It is also admitted that 1.50 crores has been adjusted towards the amount payable to the respondent bank and the balance amount of Rs.0.24 crores paid by the petitioner is kept in suspense account. The respondent bank reserves its right to file a writ petition against the order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal dated 12.09.2005. According to the respondent bank, the petitioner is not having any bona fide attempt.


4. Mr.Benjamin, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner has paid the balance amount of Rs.111.50 lakhs on 15.2.2006 even though as per the award passed in the Lok Adalat the said balance amount has to be paid by 30.9.2004. He would submit that for the period from 30.9.2004 to 15.2.2006, the petitioner has also paid Rs.24 lakhs towards interest and the same has been received by the bank. The learned counsel for the petitioner would rely upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Vijay Kumar [(2007) AIR SCW 2600: 2007 (4) MLJ 117] and submit that under similar circumstances, the Supreme Court considered the bona fide on the part of the borrower and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant bank.
4(a). He would also rely upon the latest judgement of the Division Bench of this Court dated 5.10.2007 in W.P.No.22170 of 2007 [M/s.Canara Bank vs. M/s.Coromandel Indag Products and others], wherein also under similar circumstances, the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition filed by the bank confirming the order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal in extending the time for depositing the amount accepted.
4(b). He would rely upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in Smt.Periyakkal and others vs. Smt.Dakshyani [AIR 1983 SC 428] to contend that after the compromise between the parties was accepted and in terms of compromise an order was passed by the Court, it gives jurisdiction to the Court to extend the time for payment as per the terms of compromise.
5. On the other hand, Mr.Jayesh B.Dolia, learned counsel appearing for the respondent bank would submit that the settlement in the Lok Adalat and the award passed based on it has worked itself out and as per the terms if the amount is not paid, the bank is entitled to claim the entire amount. He would submit that it is not as if the bank has received Rs.24 lakhs as interest for the default period and the amount is kept in suspense account.


6. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent bank and perused the entire records.


7. It is not in dispute that the petitioner's husband had borrowed the amount from the first respondent and the first respondent bank has filed O.A.No.474 of 2001 on the file of the second respondent Tribunal for recovery of Rs.3,59,86,583.04. Pending the said O.A., in the Lok Adalat, settlement was arrived at between the parties, viz., the applicant bank and the first respondent who is the petitioner herein in the following terms:
" Both parties agreed for one time settlement of Rs.150 lakhs (Rupees one hundred and fifty lakhs only). The matter is settled between both the parties. The defendant shall pay Rs.38.5 lakhs on or before 31st March,2004 and the balance amount of Rs.111.5 lakhs on or before September,2004 with interest at 11.5% on running balance amount from 7.2.2004. In case of any default, the Bank is at the liberty to claim the amount as per O.A. Court fee is ordered to be refunded u/s 21(1) of Legal Services Authority's Act. The Award is passed accordingly."
8. By the said terms, the petitioner has agreed to pay a total amount of Rs.150 lakhs in full and final settlement of the entire claim by the first respondent and she has also agreed to pay a sum of Rs.38.5 lakhs out of the said amount on or before 31.3.2004 and the balance amount of Rs.111.5 lakhs on or before 30.9.2004 with interest at 11.5% p.a. on running balance from 7.2.2004. The terms entered into in the Lok Adalat were recorded by the second respondent Tribunal and an award was passed on 26.2.2004.


9. It is also not in dispute that the amount of Rs.38.5 lakhs agreed as per the award has been paid by the petitioner before time, however, the balance amount of Rs.111.5 lakhs was not paid before 30.9.2004 and admittedly, the said amount was paid by the petitioner on 15.2.2006. However, it is the case of the petitioner that in respect of the delay from 30.9.2004 till 15.2.2006, she has paid the interest amount of Rs.24 lakhs which has admittedly been received by the first respondent, but, according to the first respondent, the amount is kept in suspense account. In fact, it is admitted that the said amount has not been returned to the petitioner by the bank. At this stage, it is relevant to consider the judgement of the Supreme Court in Smt.Periyakkal and others vs. Smt.Dakshyani[AIR 1983 SC 428]. In that decision, the Supreme Court has dealt with a case wherein the parties entered compromise pending second appeal and the appellant has agreed to deposit and the respondent has agreed to receive a sum of Rs.60,000/- in full and final settlement of the decree and orders were passed to the effect that on deposit of such amount, the sale which was confirmed by the trial Court and set aside by the first appellate Court, should stand set aside and the second appeal should stand dismissed and if the amount of Rs.60,000/- was not deposited on or before 30.11.1976, the second appeal stood allowed and the sale should stand confirmed. In the memorandum of compromise it was also stated that the time was the essence of contract between the parties. When the breach was committed in respect of payment, the question arose whether the Court which recorded the compromise would lose its jurisdiction to extend the time for payment. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that when a memorandum of compromise was recorded by the Court and in terms of the compromise, if a decree was passed grating time as per the memorandum of compromise for payment, it gives jurisdiction to the Court to extend the time in appropriate cases. The relevant portion of the judgement is as follows:
" 4. ...... The Court would have then decided the appeal arising out of the application on the merits. The parties, however, entered into a compromise and invited the Court to make an order in terms of the compromise, which the Court did. The time for deposit stipulated by the parties became the time allowed by the Court and this gave the Court the jurisdiction to extend time in appropriate cases. Of course, time would not be extended ordinarily, nor for the mere asking. It would be granted in rare cases to prevent manifest injustice. True, the Court would not rewrite a contract between the parties but the Court would relieve against a forfeiture clause; And, where the contract of the parties has merged in the order of the Court, the Court's freedom to act to further the ends of justice would surely not stand curtailed. ......."


10. In a recent judgement of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Vijay Kumar (2007(4) MLJ 117 (SC): 2007 AIR SCW 2600) the facts are almost similar to that of the present case. That was a case where the bank filed a suit for recovery of Rs.14,92,295.99 and decree was passed and in the revision petition filed by the bank, a compromise deed was filed at the Lok Adalat containing various terms including that the respondent was to deposit 20% of the compromise/settlement amount within 30 days i.e., on or before 28.12.2003 and the remaining amount of 80% was to be paid in equal monthly/quarterly/half yearly instalments on or before 31.3.2004 and there was a failure clause setting out the consequences of default in payment according to the time schedule. The Debts Recovery Tribunal recorded the settlement arrived in the Lok Adalat and passed an order in terms thereof. Since there was some default in payment, the bank took the stand that it is entitled to recover the entire decretal amount. The writ petition was filed in the High Court and the High Court found that there was default on the part of the respondent and directed the respondent to pay the amount within 12.7.2004 [as in the facts and circumstances of the present case] along with interest amount of Rs.45,000/- for the default period. It was held that the difficulties were genuine since the respondent has proved the bona fide by making payment of whole amount. It was, as against the order, the bank filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal, has found that even though there was some error on the part of the High Court in recording the amount, the bona fide of the respondent has been proved and held as follows:
" 5. The High Court was of the view that the first instalment was paid in time. Therefore, it accepted the stand of the writ petitioner and held that the compromise should be acted upon but directed the bank to charge interest for the defaulted period @ 10.4% p.a. A sum of Rs.20,000/- which was deposited pursuant to the Order of the High Court was directed to be adjusted for publication charges etc.


6. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant-bank submitted that the High Court has stated that the first instalment was made in time. Additionally, when the amounts had not been paid according to the fixed schedule the default clause operated arid the High Court could not have come to the aid of a defaulter.


7. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that High Court took note of all the relevant factors, the bona fides of the respondent and even had directed charging of interest which in fact has been charged by the appellant bank and has been paid. Normally, when there is failure of the terms of the settlement the default clause, if provided, operates. Therefore, in the peculiar features appellant-bank agreed to settle the claim taking into account various factors. It is true that the High Court has erroneously recorded that Rs.2,00,000/- has been paid within the stipulated time. 


The details of the payment are as follows:
Sr.No.
Date of payment
Amount(Rs.)
Mode of Payment
1
122803
90000
Cash deposited with the Respondent bank
2
1204
20000
Cash deposited with the Respondent bank
3
1504
10000
Cash deposited with the Respondent bank
4
42504
3,80,000
Cash deposited with the Respondent bank
5
71204
5,00,000
Vide bank draft deposited with the Recovery Officer.
Total
10,00,000
8. Additionally, we find that the respondent had paid Rs.45,000/- as interest for the defaulted period. Interestingly, pursuant to the order of the High Court the appellant-bank had charged interest of Rs.29,353/-. There into arrangements with third party for selling the property but the payment in respect of the sale was to be made directly to the bank.


9. It is noted that Bank at no point of time before the final payment was made, appear to have indicated that settlement failed because of failure to stick to the time schedule.
10. Above being the position, we do not find this to be a fit case where jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 exercised. The appeal is dismissed." (Emphasis supplied)


11. The said judgement of the Supreme Court was relied upon by a Division Bench of this Court in almost similar circumstances in M/s.Canara Bank vs. M/s.Coromandel Indag Products and others (W.P.No.22170 of 2007 dated 5.10.2007). That was a case relating to the compromise entered into before the Debts Recovery Tribunal agreeing to pay the amount and there was a default. When the matter was pending before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, it has extended the time. The review petition filed by the bank before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal was dismissed against which the bank has filed the writ petition stating that against the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal which has dismissed the petition for extension of time for payment of amount, no appeal can be filed and the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend the period. In the writ petition, considering the said arguments, and relying upon the judgement in State Bank of India vs. Vijay Kumar [AIR 2007 SCW 2600 : 2007 (4) MLJ (SC) 117], it was held that the Tribunal on the principles of natural justice can extend the time, if reasonable grounds are shown by the defendants and the writ petition was dismissed. The Division Bench has held that the order of Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal in extending the time for depositing the amount does not warrant interference.
12. It is seen that the petitioner's husband borrowed the amount as early as in 1991 and he subsequently died on 16.10.1993 and the case of the petitioner is that she was not aware of any proceedings till the claim petition was filed in 1998 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Chennai in O.A.No.85 of 1998 which stood transferred to the file of second respondent as O.A.No.474 of 2001. She has paid the first instalment of agreed amount as per the award passed by the Tribunal on the basis of the settlement entered into in the Lok Adalat viz., Rs.38.5 lakhs on or before 31.3.1004 and in respect of the remaining amount she has given the reason that after the death of her husband she was unable to raise any income and her children were minors and in fact, she has been hospitalised with so many ailments and she has been living with her daughter and due to that reason, she was unable to pay the balance amount. The balance amount of Rs.111.5 lakhs has been paid on 15.2.2006 and she has also paid an additional amount of Rs.24 lakhs towards interest for the delay in payment which has been received by the bank. In view of the factual situation, I am of the view that it is the bona fide situation which she has made out. In any event, the Debts Recovery Tribunal has to take the same into consideration while considering the delay in payment of amount as stated above and it cannot be stated that the Debts Recovery Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass any such order in condoning the delay in the payment of balance amount as per the award passed by the Tribunal based on the compromise entered into at the Lok Adalat.


13. In the present case, it is seen that on an application filed by the Bank before the DRT in I.A.No.37 of 2005 in O.A.No.474 of 2001 for the purpose of making the other defendants 2 to 9 also liable since the property stands in their name, by an order dated 12.09.05, the Tribunal has rejected the claim of the Bank implicating the defendants 2 to 9, however, directed the first respondent, who is the petitioner herein to pay a sum of Rs.13,55,99,185.05 with future interest @ 11.5% p.a. From 01.12.04 till the date of realisation along with costs.


14. It is also relevant to point out at this stage that the said order of the Tribunal was passed on 12.09.05, and the petitioner had paid the balance amount of Rs.111.5 lakhs after the above said order was passed by the Tribunal, and in addition to that, the petitioner had also paid the amount of Rs.24 lakhs towards interest for the belated payment and that amount was also paid during July 2006, after the said order of the Tribunal.


15. It is also further relevant to reiterate that the appeal filed by the Bank against the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal dated 12.09.05, before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal has been rejected and the said application against the defendants 2 to 9 was dismissed. Admittedly, as on date no further proceedings has been initiated and therefore the order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal has become final. Again it is relevant to note that after all these happenings the petitioner has filed a Memo/Application No.82of 2007 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal on 19.05.06 for the purpose of condoning the delay in payment of the balance outstanding amount and to direct to record that the said payment Rs.150.00 lakhs as to the full satisfaction of the entire claim. The Tribunal has not passed any orders in the said application.


16. In view of the above said factual and legal position and the peculiar circumstances in this case, especially when it is the settled legal position that once the Tribunal has recorded the Award of the Lok Adalat, it has inherent power to extend time and in the present case, it is seen that the petitioner has paid the entire amount along with the further interest of Rs.24 lakhs, I am of the considered view that the Debts Recovery Tribunal should be directed to pass orders in the Memo/Application No.82 of 2007 by taking into consideration the above said legal position and peculiar situation of the case. It is made clear that the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall pass orders on the above terms within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order. It is further made clear that this order is passed only in respect of the present case taking into consideration of the facts and circumstances and the peculiar situation of the case and this order cannot be taken as a precedent.


17. The writ petition is disposed of on the above terms. No costs. Consequently, the connected M.P. is closed.
kh/kk
To
1. Indian Bank,
No.31, Rajaji Salai,
Chennai - 1,
through its Asset Recovery Management Branch - 1,
No.55, Ethiraj Salai,
Chennai - 8.
2. The Registrar,
Debts Recovery Tribunal - II,
4th Floor, Spencers Towers Annexe,
Chennai 2.

Tax Recovery Officers Vs Bank Of India









TAX recovery Officer   Vs     Bank of India on 6 September, 2011
Author: Mr.S.J.Mukhopadhaya, Mr.Justice J.B.Pardiwala,

THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD


SPECIAL
CIVIL APPLICATION No. 13196 of 2008
With

SPECIAL
CIVIL APPLICATION No. 888 of 2009
For
Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE
THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. S.J. MUKHOPADHAYA HONOURABLE
TAX RECOVERY OFFICER - Petitioner(s)MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Versus

BANK

OF INDIA & 2 - Respondent(s)Appearance :-MR
KM PARIKH for Petitioner(s) : 1, NOTICE SERVED BY DS for
Respondent(s) : 1,
RULE SERVED for Respondent(s) : 1, MR BJ
TRIVEDI for Respondent(s) : 1, MR JT TRIVEDI for Respondent(s) : 1,
MS JIGNASA B TRIVEDI for Respondent(s) : 1, SERVED BY
AFFIX.-(R) for Respondent(s) : 2, MR BHARAT T RAO for
Respondent(s) : 3,
............................................................................

CORAM
:

HONOURABLE
THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. S.J. MUKHOPADHAYA



HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

Date
: 6-9-2011

CAV
JUDGMENT

(Per
: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. S.J. MUKHOPADHAYA)


1. As
both the cases have been preferred by a common petitioner, i.e. the Tax Recovery Officer, Panchmahal Range, Godhra, and a common question of law is involved, they were heard together, and being disposed of by this common judgement.



2. The
only question involved in the present case is whether the charge created by the respective borrowers in favour of their respective secured creditor Banks is saved under the proviso to sub-sec.(1) of Sec.281 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, or is void as against the claim of tax payable by the borrower - assessee in favour of the Revenue - the writ petitioners.


3. To
determine the issue, it is necessary to notice the relevant facts of each case, as discussed hereunder:


4. S.C.A.
No.13196 of 2008:- The
case of the petitioner is that the 2nd respondent M/s. Somani Cement Company Limited, which is the borrower of 1st respondent Bank - Bank of India, is one of the assessee in default, and is liable to pay huge outstanding demand of more than Rs.27 crores to the petitioner Department for the assessment year 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98, 1998-99 under the Income Tax Act, 1961.


5. The
1st respondent Bank of India initiated recovery proceeding against the 2nd respondent borrower for recovery of secured debts. The petitioner Tax Recovery Officer, Godhra, in the meantime, has issued demand notice to the 2nd respondent, which has failed to pay huge income tax dues, and consequently the petitioner - Department passed an order of attachment of immoveable property on 7/18 October 2002, and attached the immoveable property. The warrant of attachment of moveable or immoveable property under Rule 20 of the 2nd Schedule was issued on 26th December 2002, thereby, the moveable assets of the 2nd respondent were also attached.


6. Similarly,
one M/s. Shreyas Equipment Limited failed to pay the outstanding tax demand. The petitioner - Department passed an order of attachment of immoveable property on 18th October 2002. Panchmana was also prepared on the same date. Thereby, the moveable and immoveable properties of the 2nd respondent were attached by the petitioner - Department.


7. The
respondent Bank of India moved before the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, for recovery of the amount; on 20th November 2002 the Debt Recovery Tribunal passed an order of attachment of immoveable property of the 2nd respondent. The petitioner - Department having come to know of the order of attachment passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, issued a notice of attachment under Rule 31 of the 2nd Schedule on 23rd January 2003 to the Registrar, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ahmedabad, in R.P. No.980.



8. In
the meantime, the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, passed an order on 19th December 2002 for sale of immoveable property fixing 30th January 2003 as the date for auction sale.



9. On
16th January 2003, the counsel for the 2nd respondent appeared before the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ahmedabad, in R.P. No.980, and agreed to cooperate with the 1st respondent Bank for recovery the certified dues. At the instance of the 1st respondent Bank of India, the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad issued fresh sale proclamation on 26th October 2004 fixing 27th December 2004 as the date of auction. The second public auction also failed and resulted in an unsuccessful attempt.


10. The
1st respondent Bank of India filed an application on 16th December 2005 requesting the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad, to hold the public auction on 27th February 2006. The case was accordingly adjourned. The auction was deferred for one month i.e. 27th February 2006. In the meantime, on 21st February 2006, the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, passed an order to attach moveable assets of the 2nd respondent and re-fix the public auction on 27th April 2006.



11. On
24th April 2006, the Recovery Officer considered the objection filed by the Sales Tax Department of the State, Income Tax Department as also by the Gujarat Industrial Corporation Limited, which claimed their dues.


12. In
the meantime, the Bank of India issued advertisement on 10th April 2006 in local newspapers for public auction of moveable and immoveable property of the 2nd respondent. The petitioner Department lodged objection and made claim on 17th April 2006 before the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad in R.P. No.980. In view of the objection raised by the Sales Tax Department of the State, Income Tax Department and Gujarat Industrial Corporation Limited and their claims, the intending bidders withdrew themselves from the public auction.


13. On
12th July 2007, the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad, directed that till the objections of Income Tax Department, Sales Tax Department of the State and Gujarat Industrial Corporation Limited are decided, sale of moveable and immoveable assets will not take place; only after such decision, the auction sale may proceed. After hearing the parties, by order dated 9th may 2008, the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad, rejected the objections raised by the Income Tax Department and decided to recover the dues of the Bank of India first, and observed that after such recovery, if any amount remains as balance, the dues of the Income Tax Department, Sales Tax Department and others can be paid.


14. Against
the said order, the petitioner - Department filed appeal u/Sec.30 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as `the R.D.D.B. Act') before the Presiding Officer Debt Recovery Tribunal II Ahmedabad in Appeal No. 69 of 2008.



15. During
the pendency of the said appeal, on 6th August 2008, the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal II Ahmedabad, held public auction and highest offer of M/s. AAYFA Infrastructure of Rs.60 lakhs was accepted. The sale of moveable and immoveable property was subsequently confirmed in favour of said M/s. AAYFA Infrastructure.



16. The
Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad, dismissed the Appeal No.69 of 2008 by order and judgement dated 7th October 2008.



17. S.C.A.
No. 888 of 2009:- In this case, the 2nd respondent M/s. Kanugo Tubes (India) Limited (hereinafter referred to as `KTL'), is the assessee of petitioner Income Tax Department, and is the borrower of 1st respondent Bank of Baroda. The said 2nd respondent obtained financial assistance from Bank of Baroda, and created charge of equitable mortgage by depositing the original title deed of the property in question in favour of said Bank of Baroda on 1st June 1989. It was extended from time to time.


18. The
2nd respondent KTL, which was initially constituted as a partnership firm with effect from 3rd November 1988, filed its income tax returns for the assessment years 1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95 and for succeeding assessment years with the concerned Assessing Officer. It failed to repay the outstanding dues of Bank of Baroda, and therefore, the Bank of Baroda filed an application u/Sec.19 of the R.D.D.B. Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad, in Original Application No.187 of 1998. After contest, the Recovery Certificate was issued by the Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, on 8th March 2001 in favour of the Bank of Baroda against the 2nd respondent.



19. The
Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad, at the instance of Bank of Baroda, initiated Recovery Proceeding No.685 for recovery of certified dues from the 2nd respondent.


20. The
assessing officer of Income Tax Department passed order of assessment u/Sec.143(3) read with Sec.147 on 29th December 2000 against the 2nd respondent for Assessment Year 1995-96. When the matter was pending, the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad, passed an order of attachment of immoveable property in question on 24th April 2003.


21. The
petitioner - Department also passed an order of attachment of the very same immoveable property of 2nd respondent company on 22nd September 2003 for recovery of arrears of tax for the assessment year 1995-96 and assessment year 1997-98, which was duly served on the 2nd respondent. A panchnama was also drawn showing attachment of the immoveable property of the 2nd respondent situated at G.I.D.C., Kalol. Proclamation of sale was made by the petitioner Department on 23rd February 2004 in respect of attached immoveable property of the 2nd respondent fixing the sale attachment of the property as described therein. A public notice was also issued by the petitioner Department on 4th March 2004 in the local daily (Sandesh), Panchmahal Publication, Dahod Edition, in respect of sale of attached assets and properties of the 2nd respondent and other defaulters. Pursuant to the public notice for auction for attached properties, the Bank of Baroda by letter dated 5th March 2004 requested the petitioner Department not to dispose of the assets of the 2nd respondent for the reasons mentioned in the said letter.



22. According
to the petitioner, it lodged claim of recovery of tax arrears from the 2nd respondent company for the assessment years 1996-97 and 1997-98, vide letter dated 23rd August 2004, and has also lodged claim of recovery of tax arrears with the Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad, on 23rd August 2004, 28th September 2005, 17th June 2006, 3rd August 2006, 14th June 2007 and 28th September 2007. The petitioner Department requested the Debt Recovery Tribunal to consider the same in accordance with law claiming priority over the dues of the 2nd respondent.


23. The
Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad, issued a notice on 11th July 2008 incorporating therein the terms of sale proclamation and passed consequential orders. The public auction of the immoveable property was fixed on 18th November 2008, which was held on the said date in favour of highest successful auction purchaser; the matter was adjourned to 2nd December 2008.


24. At
that stage, petitioner Income Tax Department lodged 3rd party objection on 16th December 2008 in the Recovery Proceedings No.685 with the Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad. The Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad, by its order dated 22nd December 2008 rejected the application.



25. Learned
counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Income Tax Department having first charge over the property, it was not open to the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal II, Ahmedabad, to auction sale the same very property. It was also contended that the Income Tax Department has priority over the property than the charge created in favour of the Banks.


26. A
specific stand has been taken that the mortgage made in favour of the Banks by the assessee (borrower) is void as against the claim of tax of the Income Tax Department as per sub-sec.(1) of Sec.281 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.



27. Per
contra, according to learned counsel for the Banks, in absence of any statutory provision, the Income Tax Department cannot claim either first charge or priority over the secured charge of the Banks.


28. It
was also contended that the mortgage having been made prior to the assessment proceedings, and in absence of any notice to the Banks regarding pendency of the Income Tax proceedings, the mortgage as made in favour of the Banks cannot be held to be void, it stands saved under proviso to sub-sec.(1) of Sec.281 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.



29. Before
we decide the issue, certain relevant facts are required to be noticed in the case of both the assessee 2nd respondents of each case vis-à-vis the mortgage created in favour of the 1st respondent Bank of each case.



30. In
S.C.A. No.13196 of 2008, the income tax proceeding relates to assessment year 1992-93 onwards initiated against the assessee - 2nd respondent M/s. Somani Cement Company Limited. The petitioner has not made it clear as to since which date income tax proceeding is pending against the 2nd respondent assessee, i.e. prior to 25th October 1994 or thereafter. Registered Folio No. 163, which relates to creation of charge by 2nd respondent in favour of Bank of India, shows that the Board of Directors of the Company on 25th October 1994 handed over and deposited the title deeds of the land in question with the Bank of India. Therein, moveable and immoveable properties of borrower were mentioned, which are situated in village Kharsalia via Vijalpur, Survey Nos. 350/1, 350/4, 350/5 and 350/6 of Mouje Jitpura, Taluka Godhra, District Panchmahals. In the said mortgage deed, it was specifically mentioned by the 2nd respondent that "no proceeding for recovery of tax are pending against the 2nd respondent company under the Income Tax Act, 1961 or any other law, and that no notice has been issued and/or served upon the Company under Rule 2, 16, 51 or any other Rules of the 2nd Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961." Such specific disclosure made therein being relevant is quoted hereunder:
"Mr.
Govind Gendalal Somani further assured and declared to the Bank on behalf of the Company that the title deeds deposited with the Bank are the only title deeds in respect of the said immovable properties which are equitably mortgaged to the Bank and that the Company is the absolute owner of the said immovable properties and that the company has marketable title thereto and that there is no mortgage, charge or lien or other encumbrance or attachment on the said immovable properties or any part or parts thereof in favour of any Government or the Income Tax Department or any other Government Department, or any person, firm or company, body corporate or society or entity whomsoever and that the Company has not entered into any agreement for sale thereof or any part or parts thereof and that no such mortgage, charge or lien or other encumbrances whatsoever will be created or attachment allowed to be levied on the said immovable properties or any part or parts thereof in favour of or by or on behalf of any Government or Government Department or any person, firm, company, body corporate or society or entity whatsoever other than the Bank so long as the Company continues to be indebted to or liable to the Bank on any account in any manner whatsoever, and that no proceedings for recovery of taxes are pending against the company under the Income tax Act or any other law, and that no notice has been issued and/or served upon the Company under Rules 2, 16, or 51 or any other rules of the Second Schedule to the Income tax Act, 1961 (as amended) or under any other law and that there is no pending attachment whatsoever levied howsoever on the said immovable properties."


31. The
above mentioned fact had not been disputed by the petitioner Recovery Officer, Income Tax Department.


32. So
far as the 2nd case S.C.A. No.888 of 2009 is concerned, the petitioner has accepted that equitable mortgage was created by the 2nd respondent - KTL in favour of Bank of Baroda on 1st June 1989, which was extended from time to time.



33. The
petitioner itself has stated that the 2nd respondent filed returns as per the returns of income tax for the assessment years 1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95 for all successful years with the concerned assessing officer, when it was a partnership firm. It is only when the 2nd respondent was made a Company under the Companies Act, 1956, from 21 February 1995 the arrears of tax were not paid for the assessment years 1995-96 and assessment year 1997-98. Thus, it is evident that the income tax proceeding was initiated by the petitioner Income Tax Department much after the mortgage made by 2nd respondent in favour of the Bank (on 1st June 1989).



34. It
is a settled law that the State will have priority over the unsecured creditor in recovery of its dues. One may raise the question whether State can claim priority over the debts of the Bank, which have been secured by the borrower by creating mortgage.


35. A
charge is a wider term, which also includes mortgage. A mortgagor can mortgage the property with the mortgager's interest in the property with a Bank or financial institution, which becomes a secured creditor within the meaning of Sec.2(ze) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.


36. If
under the law there is a first charge created with the State, even a secured creditor, which has secured interest on the property, cannot claim any right, the State having first charge over such property.



37. But,
in the present case, such issues are not required to be determined in absence of any provision creating first charge over the property under the Income Tax Act. There is no such provision laid down under the Income Tax Act, under which, the Income Tax Department can claim priority over the secured creditor.


38. The
only question which arises for determination as noticed above is whether the mortgage made by respective borrowers in favour of their respective secured creditor Banks is saved under the proviso to sub-sec.(1) of Sec.281 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 or is void as against the claim of tax payable by the borrower - assessee in favour of Revenue.



39. For
determination of the aforesaid issue, it is necessary to notice Sec. 281 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which reads as follows:-
"281.
(1) Where, during the pendency of any proceeding under this Act or after the completion thereof, but before the service of notice under rule 2 of the Second Schedule, any assessee creates a charge on, or parts with the possession (by way of sale, mortgage, gift, exchange or any other mode of transfer whatsoever) of, any of his assets in favour of any other person, such charge or transfer shall be void as against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee as a result of the completion of the said proceeding or otherwise :
Provided
that such charge or transfer shall not be void if it is made--
(i) for
adequate consideration and without notice of the pendency of such proceeding or, as the case may be, without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee ; or
(ii) with
the previous permission of the Assessing Officer.
(2)
This section applies to cases where the amount of tax or other sum payable or likely to be payable exceeds five thousand rupees and the assets charged or transferred exceed ten thousand rupees in value.
Explanation.--In
this section, "assets" means land, building, machinery, plant, shares, securities and fixed deposits in banks, to the extent to which any of the assets aforesaid does not form part of the stock-in-trade of the business of the assessee."


40. Similar
issue fell for consideration before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Abhaykumar reported in (1992) 86 Sales Tax Cases 88, wherein almost similar provision i.e. Sec.33-A of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 fell for consideration. The Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the transfer was for a valuable consideration and it was without notice of the pendency of the proceeding under the Sales-tax Act, and therefore, the transfer falls under the exception created by the proviso to Section 33-A of the said Act. Similar was the view expressed by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Gwalior Bench) in the case of Pooranchand Ved Prakash v. The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (1973) XXXI Sales Tax Cases 170.



41. Sec.281
of the Income Tax Act also fell for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Tax Recovery Officer v. Industrial Financial Corporation of India in Special Civil Application No. 3786 of 2010 with another case wherein by judgment dated 22nd June 2011, this Court taking into consideration the facts that the transfer of property was made for valuable consideration without notice of proceeding of recovery of arrears of income tax held that the financial institution was entitled to protection under the proviso to clause (1) of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.281 of the Income Tax Act against the arrears of income tax dues of the revenue.



42. In
the case of Bank of India, we have noticed that in the mortgage deed a specific statement was made by 2nd respondent in Special Civil Application No.13196 of 2008 that:
"No
proceeding for recovery of tax are pending against the Company under the Income Tax Act or any other law, and that no notice has been issued and/or served upon the company under Rule 2, 16 or 51 or any other Rules of the second schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 (as amended) or under any other law and that there is no pending attachment whatsoever levied howsoever on the said immovable properties"



This
has not been disputed by the petitioner Income Tax Department.


43. The
Bank of India has also specifically pleaded that it had no inkling of any initiation/pendency of proceeding of income tax in respect of outstanding dues of the Income Tax Department. It is also not in dispute that the transfer was made on payment of consideration, i.e. on receipt of credit facility by the borrower, and no proceeding was brought to the knowledge of the respondents.


44. In
the second case, we have noticed that the 2nd respondent M/s. Kanugo Tubes (India) Limited made an equitable mortgage by depositing original title deeds in favour of 1st respondent Bank of Baroda on 1st June 1989 which was extended from time to time. The Income Tax proceeding related to assessment year 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98, notice of which was served on the 2nd respondent. In fact, the returns were was initially filed only for the assessment year 1999 onwards, and therefore, it is clear that the mortgage was created when no proceeding was pending against the 2nd respondent - Kanugo Tubes (India) Limited. We also find that the mortgage was created by the 2nd respondent Kanugo Tubes (India) Limited in favour of Bank of Baroda, it having received financial assistance from the said Bank. Therefore, the consideration amount was passed while transfer by way of mortgage was made, and there was no income tax proceeding pending.



45. In
view of the aforesaid facts, we hold that both the 1st respondents Bank of India and Bank of Baroda are saved under clause (i) of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.281 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the charge having been created for adequate consideration and without notice of pendency of income tax proceeding. In this background, the petitioner Income tax Department cannot allege that the mortgage made by the 2nd respondent of each case in favour of 1st respondents in both the cases, i.e. Bank of India and Bank of Baroda respectively, are void as against the claim in respect of income tax arrears of the petitioner - Department. In absence of any merit, the writ petitions are dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs.



(S.J.
MUKHOPADHAYA, C.J.)



(J.B.
PARDIWALA, J.)

(sn
devu pps)



In
view of the findings given in the judgment and the reasons recorded therein, the prayer for interim relief orally requested by the learned counsel for the petitioners is rejected.


(S.J.
MUKHOPADHAYA, C.J.)



(J.B.
PARDIWALA, J.)

mathews/sndevu

Monday, October 24, 2011

For banks, recovery of bad loans remains a challenge





Source :T.S.krishnamurthy:BL:Oct 23,2011
Debt Recovery Tribunals,
 BIFR have not served their cause well

The downgrading of State Bank of India (SBI) by credit rating agency Moody's and the consequent turmoil in the stock market is a much-talked-about issue currently.
The downgrading is mainly due to SBI's Tier-1 capital adequacy ratio coming down to 7.6 per cent against the norm of 8 per cent.
This is a direct consequence of the increase in gross non-performing assets (NPAs) to 3.52 per cent and the consequent higher provisions to be made.
Though the case of SBI is the talking point now, the rise in NPAs is a phenomenon afflicting all banks.
In an earlier article (Business Line, September 4, 2011), the broad reasons for the spurt in NPAs and the difficulties faced by banks in recovering bad loans through the SARFRAESI (Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest) Act were highlighted.

DRT INEFFECTIVE

Another well-intentioned measure of the Government which has turned awry is the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) Act.
DRTs were established in 1993 by an Act of Parliament for expeditious recovery of debts in excess of Rs 10 lakh due to banks and financial institutions (FIs).
They were expected to dispose of the cases within a maximum period of six months. But, in practice, it takes years to realise the dues through DRTs.
The reasons for such delay are broadly as follows:
The number of cases handled by DRTs has increased manifold, but sufficient number of DRTs have not been established.
In many DRTs, the posts of presiding officers have been vacant for quite while, resulting thereby in a large pendency of cases.
Often, the borrowers and guarantors raise frivolous issues leading to prolonged hearing and, consequently, delays.
Once the case is decided by the DRT, the presiding officers issue recovery certificates which are to be executed through recovery officers appointed by the DRT.
Sufficient number of recovery officers is not available to handle the large number of cases.
The execution of recovery certificates by the recovery officers often gets delayed following disputes by various claimants, problems in identifying properties, and so on.
It is time the authorities concerned plugged these loopholes, set up more DRTs, and appoint sufficient number of presiding and recovery officers to handle the large number of pending cases.

BIFR BUGBEAR

Another bugbear for banks is the large number of cases registered with the BIFR (Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction) under SICA (Sick Industrial Companies Act) Special Provisions, 1985.
This was a special legislation enacted in public interest for:
timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies; and
speedy enforcement of remedial measures.
Under the Act, any manufacturing company whose accumulated losses exceed its net worth has to compulsorily register itself with the BIFR, a quasi-judicial body, so that with the assistance of the operating agency (OA) appointed by it, the unit can be revived by sanctioning a rehabilitation scheme and pass orders for winding up if found unviable.
The process is quite time consuming involving several steps such as registration, admission of the registration, appointment of OA, preparation of Draft Rehabilitation Scheme (DRS), circulating the scheme among various stakeholders, sanctioning the rehabilitation scheme and implementation of the scheme through a monitoring agency (MA).
At every stage, there are litigations galore and the whole process takes years. The earliest case pending with the BIFR is that of Aluminium Industries Ltd, registered a quarter century back in 1987.
Even now, the status of the case recorded in the BIFR Web site is ‘DRS awaited'. According to Section 22 of the Act, once a unit is registered with the BIFR it enjoys immunity from legal and other recovery proceedings by the creditors.
This provision has emboldened many units to use this as an escape route by registering with the BIFR by forcibly making the net worth negative by creative accounting — writing off fixed assets, writing off debtors, and so on — resulting in losses to creditors and mounting NPAs.
Even if finally the unit is found unviable and winding up orders are passed by the BIFR, it is often too late by that time to realise anything out of the assets of the company.
Whatever order is passed by the BIFR, it is invariably challenged before the Appellate Authority and the whole process starts all over again.

NCLT, NCALT

Realising the difficulties faced by the creditors as well as genuine sick companies due to the delay in the process, SICA 1985 was repealed by the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003 by an Act of Parliament.
The Act attempted to remove the bottlenecks in SICA and curb the practice of turning an operationally fit company into a sick unit. Many provisions of SICA were incorporated in Chapter 6A of the Companies Act, 1956.
A National Companies Law Tribunal (NCLT) was to be formed for hearing the references and the appellate authority was the National Companies Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT).
However, for reasons unknown the repeal of SICA and the formation of NCLT and NCALT have not been given effect to yet and SICA and BIFR are still in force.
It is time the authorities concerned initiated necessary steps in the matter.
(The author is a former Deputy General Manager of State Bank of Travancore, Mysore.)
Keywords: Debt Recovery Tribunals,